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The Legal Systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
The outstanding characteristc of the legal systems of the former
High Commission Territories of Botswana (former Bechuanaland
Protectorate), Lesotho (former Basutoland) and Swaziland, as is the
1
case with most African States , is the "dual" nature of their laws, 
whereby the indigenous (customary) law exists side by side with the 
received or imposed foreign system of law. In the case of all three 
countries the received foreign law is the law of the former South 
African colony of the Cape (in the case of Botswana and Lesotho) 
and of the Transvaal (in the case of Swaziland). South Africa, by 
virtue of her economic power in Southern Africa, has continued to
have influence in the affairs of these three countries, more so in
2
legal and political affairs, including human rights matters. It, 
therefore, becomes necessary to briefly trace the history of how 
the foreign law came to be the law of the three States.
Basutoland3
The former colony of Basutoland was the rirst to receive Cape law. 
This country first came under British rule in 1 B68 when its 
territory and inhaoitants were declared British subjects. From 
that year up to 1B71 the country was governed by the British High 
Commissioner for the Cape Colony who issued regulations for its
good government. In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the Cape.
From that year up to 1BB3, Basutoland was ruled as part of the 
Cape Colony. However, since the annexation had been effected 
without the prior consent of the inhabitants, there was a lot 
of discontent against Cape rule. When the Cape government 
sought to disarm Africans throughout Southern Africa, the inhaoitants 
of Basutoland refused to be disarmed, and this led to the "Gun War" 
(1BBQ - 1B81) in which the Cape authorities were unable to achieve 
the disarmament of Basutoland's inhabitants. At the end of that 
war, the Cape handed Basutoland back to the British who formally
took over its administration in 188A.
The fundamental law of the territory was laid down in the
General Law Proclamation which provided that the law to be applied
in Basutoland would be "the same as the law for the time being in 
the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope". The indigenous law might be 
applied in two instances, first, in matters concerning "natives", 
and secondly, in all matters in the "native courts". Commenting 
on this provision, Palmer and Poulter have this to say:
"It may therefore be stated categorically that so far 
as the African inhabitants of Lesotho are concerned,
African law stands basically on an equal footing with
the common law. In no sense is the customary law
placed in a fundamentally inferior or subsidiary
position as it is in some other African countries
5
e.g. Botswana and Swaziland" .
The above statement is not absolutely correcr. At the original
negotiations for the British "protection" of Easutoiand prior to
1868, it was the wish of the inhabitants of Basutoland that
internal- matters within Basutoland would be governed by indigenous
law. This wish persisted throughout the colonial period.
The system of "indirect rule" assisted the application of customary
law. At independence in 1966 the Constitution recognised "law" as
including the customary law of the land. The result is that in
Lesotho the customary law is a legal system, not just a system of
rules to be applied occasionally. This does not, however, mean
that the customary law is in competition with the receiveo law.
Together with the reception of Cape law was received the British 
7
system of government. English constitutional and administrative law 
consequently came to be the law of Basutoland. The institutional 
framework for the administration of justice and for the making of 
laws is oased on English administrative concepts. The result is 
that the received law predominates, while the customary law 
operates within the terms of reference of the received law.
- 3 -
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2. Bechuanaland Protectorate
British "protection" of Bechuanaland (now Botswana) was first
proclaimed in 10Q5 by an Order in Council of January 27, 1BQ5.
The government of the territory was provided for by another
Order in Council of May 9, 1891 which came into farce on June U, 
g
1891. This Order provided that the British High Commissioner for 
South Africa would be an administrator for the territory, that 
he could legislate through proclamation, that he could appoint 
such officers as he might from time to time think fit, to assist 
him in the administration of the territory. It was further 
provided that in issuing proclamations, the High Commissioner was 
to respect "any native laws or customs by which the civil relations 
of any native chiefs, tribes and populations" of the territory 
were regulated, except in so far as these laws and customs might 
be incompatible with the exercise of British power and 
jurisdiction. The customary law was, therefore, to be respected.
In this sense it may be justified to conclude that in Lesotho 
customary law is given greater recognition tnan it is in Botswana. 
The judicial attitude in Botswana with regard to the applicable 
legal system is that the received law is applicable to all persons 
except in so far as its application may be excluded by statute:
"There were not two common laws in the Protectorate 
but, where practicable, effect was to be given in 
suits between Africans to their own law and custom".
During the early years of British rule, colonial power was 
confined to external affairs; later years witnessed increasing 
interference in internal matters of the territory, by the High 
Commissioner's Proclamation of December 22, 1909^ the 
fundamental law of the territory was finally settled as follows:
-  u -
"subject to the provision of any Order in Council in force 
in the Bechuanaland Protectorate at the date of the taking
effect of this Proclamation,  the laws in force in the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the 16th day of June,
1891, shall mutadis mutandis and so far as not inapplicable 
be the laws in force and to be observed in the said 
Protectorate, but no statute of the Colony of the Cape of 
Good Gope, promulgated after the 10th day of June, 1891, 
shall be deemed to apply, or to have applied, to the said 
Protectorate unless specifically applied thereto by 
Proclamation".
In this way the law of the Cape Colony came to be the general law 
of Bechuanaland, ana the English constitutional and administrative 
law came to apply to the country, just as was the case in Basutoland.
123. Swaziland
In the latter half of the nineteenth centrury Swaziland was an 
area of conflict of interests between European settlers of British origin 
and those of Dutch origins. The British government was attempting to curb 
power and independence of the Dutch colonists in their efforts 
to establish inaependent republics in the interior of Southern Africa 
after fleeing from British rule in the Cape in 183A. Swaziland on 
the other hand found in the Europeans possible allies against Zulu 
power which threatened that country. The first penetration by 
Europeans into Swaziland took place in the early 13A0's during the 
reign of Mswati (18A0-1868). During the subsequent reign of 
Mbandzeni (from around 187A) numerous and reckless land concessions 
were granted by Swaziland to the Europeans. Mbandzeni himself had 
succeeded to the Swazi throne through the military assistance of 
the Transvaal ReDudlic, one of the Dutch settlements in the 
interior. In this way the Transvaal obtained a foothold in the 
affairs of Swaziland. But then that republic was annexed by 
the British in 1877. That annexation was, however, soon rescinded
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by the Pretoria Convention of 1881, and in it the British insisted 
an a clause providing for the independence of Swaziland. The 
provision for independence was subsequently re-enacted in the 
London Convention of 188A. However, since land concessions had 
already been granted to the Transvaal Republic as well as to 
individual Europeans, the influence of that republic on Swazi 
affairs continued, and the Swazi themselves did not resist it:
"On the contrary, it is clear that apart from the immediate 
profit from the sale of concessions, they welcomed the 
prospect of closer association with Europeans and the 
protection which they might afford.^gainst the Zulu or 
other powerful Native neighbours".
In the result, the Transvaal Republic flouted the provisions of 
the 1Q81 and 188A Conventions concerning the indepenaence of 
Swaziland; the European concession holders, both British and Dutch, 
disregarded the authority of the Swazi chiefs; there was constant 
friction between the two sections of Europeans over conflicting 
concessions; and some Europeans requested the Transvaal to take 
over the administration of the territory.
Meanwhile the law of the Transvaal had been applied informaily 
to the Europeans in Swaziland. After the death of Moandzeni in 
1889, the British and the Transvaal government agreed by the 
Convention of 1890 on joint administration of Swaziland. This 
convention provided for a "Chief Court" to settle disputes amongst 
Europeans in Swaziland. The system of law to be applied was the 
Roman-Dutch law. The new government was to have no jurisdiction 
over the "Swazi Natives". This system of government did not 
last for long because it suffered from internal disagreements 
between the two European factions. And by the Convention of 189A. 
the British and the Transvaal agreed to the grant of "all rights 
and powers of protection. The rule of the Transvaai over 
Swaziland did not itself last, for the Anglo-Boer war soon broke 
out and, at its conclusion, the Transvaal was made a British 
colony together with Swaziland.
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The British administration of Swaziland was provided for, 
first, by the Order in Council of the 25th June, 1903, by which 
the Governor of the Transvaal was to be the administrator of 
Swaziland. When in 190S the Transvaal received self-government, 
the British High Commissioner for South Africa was made the 
administrator of Swaziland by virtue of the Swaziland Order in 
Council of December 1, 1906. The Commissioner was given similar 
powers to those given to him in respect of Bechuanaland.
The fundamental law of Swaziland was provided for oy the High
1 A —Commissioner's Proclamation of 1907 which applied the laws of
the Transvaal to Swaziland, and which further provided that the
territory should be ruled as a district of the Transvaal. The
Orders in Council of 1903 and 1906 had provided that the British
Administrator, in making laws, should "respect any IMative laws
by which the civil relations of any IMative Chiefs, tribes or
populations are now regulated, except in so far as may be
incompatible with the due exercise of His Majesty's power and
jurisdiction or is clearly injurious to the welfare of the said
IMatives". It was therefore, provided in a Proclamation of 1907
that the Swazi King and chiefs would continue to adjudicate on
matters concerning the African population, but only in civil
disputes.
It is to be noticed that the position of the customary law 
in Swaziland in relation to the foreign law is similar to 
that of it in Botswana. Customary law is to be respected to the 
extent that there is no serious conflict between it and the 
received foreign law. It is also to be noted that, while in 
Botswana and Lesotho the received law is the legal system of the 
former Cape Colony, in Swaziland the law of the Transvaal was 
applied. This makes no difference however, since the Transvaal 
law originated from the Cape.
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The legal tradition of the three countries with which we 
are dealing here is the same: the existence of two legal
systems within a country, one such system deing the so-called 
Roman-Dutch law, while the other is the customary. These two 
systems apply to the same people, or rather to the African 
inhabitants of these countries. The subjection of a people 
to two systems of law can easily lead to injustice and serious 
conflicts which may need the attention of the legislature.
15A. Roman-Dutch Law in Holland
The legal system which was introduced into the three countries 
was the law of the Cape and of the Transvaal. Brief attention 
should now be paid to the nature of that system of law as far as 
human rights are concerned.
The law of the Cape Colony originally came from Holland, a 
province of the Netherlands. It was introduced by the Dutch 
East India Company which established a refreshment station in 
1652 at the southern tip of Africa. The law of Holland,
(called Roman-Dutch Law) and not that of the Netherlands, was
introduced because Holland was the most influential province in 
the affairs of the Dutch East India Company, and also because 
there was no common legal system for the Netherlands, since each 
province had its own legal system.^
The classical period of the Roman-Dutch law is the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. Those centuries produced the greatest 
of the Dutch legal minds who succeeded in formulating a legal
17system for Holland out of the ancient Roman law and Germanic Customs.
Ihe seventeenth century was also a period of commercial prosperity
for the Netherlands. "Her trade spanned the globe, her ships sailed
the five oceans, and from all corners of the world riches poured into
10
her great cities". But it was also a period of great political 
conflicts. Religious intolerance was very cornnon, leading to bloody
-  a
wars. The Roman-Dutch system of law was shaped by the needs and
circumstances of that time.
Roman-Dutch law provided for some of the basic freedoms
as we understand them to-day. The question of the enforcement
of the freedoms is of course another matter. Some of the
guarantees against oppression may be stated here. The sovereign
and law-maker was subject to the law in the sense that he did
not possess arbitrary power. The sovereign, in making laws, must
be guided by certain accepted ethical principles. Thus, laws
must be iust and reasonable, because a law "prescribes what is
i9honourable and forbids what is base". Laws must apply equally
to all citizens without discrimination. Roman-Dutch law
recognised the principle of freedom of the person. "As regards
persons, all human beings are with us free from birth, and
slavery is wholly unknown to us and out of use....", wrote van 
2DLeeuwen in 1678. An inquiry into the legality of a detained 
person could be undertaken through the procedure of the writ 
de homine libera exhibendo. This procedure is now considered
practically the same as the English common law procedure of
, K 21 habeas corpus.
There were within the Roman-Dutch legal system, however, 
shortcomings which must be considered serious by present day 
standards. Although human beings were born free, and slavery 
was forbidden these things were operative only at home in the 
Netherlands and not in the colonies. It is thus remarked by 
Professors Hahlo and Kahn:
"During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most 
Europeans accepted slavery as a perfectly legitimate 
institution, as long as it was applied to blacks, 
browns, and yellows, nor the canon law opposed
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Since Netherlands law forbade slavery, those slaves who
entered Netherlands borders were automatically freed
regardless of the wishes of their masters. Yet there was an
important exception to this rule: fugitive slaves fleeing
23from the colonies could not be freed. Dutch society, as 
did other European communities, tolerated slavery for economic 
reasons.
Roman-Dutch law did not pretend to confer equality of 
status on free males and females. Women were naturally inferior 
in intellect and tended to act contrary to their interests in 
the management of worldly affairs. Women thus needed the 
guardianship of men who must govern the "weaker sex". As a 
result women were discriminated against both in matters of State 
government and family affairs. But even then it was realised 
that the Roman law, from which the Roman-Dutch law was derived, 
treated women better. The ancient Romans recognised the fact 
that "in many women the understanding is found to be superior, 
and in many men inferior, so that there are many women who
25
surpass men in understanding, and the management of affairs".
Consequently Roman law permitted women who had attained
majority, to manage both themselves and their property. Despite
this reality, Roman-Dutch law, following Germanic customs,
26
subjected women to the authority of men. The political 
conditions of women have changed immensely today, but in family 
matters their condition is still that of subjection to male 
domination. The disabilities of women in family affairs were 
summarised by Grotius thus:
"By virtue of his guardianship, the husband appears 
for his wife in Court. He alienates and encumders 
her property, even that which she has kept out of 
the community, at his pleasure and without 
requiring her consent.
ID
If tne husoana contracts aects, the wife becomes
27iiaole for the same even against her will ..."
Religious intolerance was very common in Holland, as in the 
rest or Euroce at that time. The Dutch Reformed Lhurcn was 
the oniy permissible faith. Rdman Catholics suffered from 
very serious oisaoilities. This was to oe the case at the Cape
_ 7Q
until the mntisn Drouont aDout a cna.nge.-
Cust as tne enslavement of blacK peaoie was permissible in
European societies of the seventeenth ano eighteenth centuries,
so was the practice of colonising the lands and countries of
non-Eurodeans. tnrougnaut the world. Nationalism ano
seif-aeterminacion were for Europe only, ana not for "men of
ccicur". Ail Kinas of pretences were usea to justify tne taicing
over of wnoie continents. Eitner these foreign _anos were
unmhaoiteo or were innaoitea by roaming savages cnus justifying
b e  tSKing ever of these _anos. Bv reoucina the i.naigenous
peocie to tne status cf savages ana "natives", Eurooeans reasoneG
that orcmary "civiiiseo" legal rul.es orctecting ncnts to
13property cia net aopiy in the case or these suo-numans. iJhere 
tnera was a semo-ance of negotiations ana agreement as to rignts 
to procerty, there was no effort to negotiate from the point of 
vieu of ruies as uncerstooo oy the inoigenous peoples, so that 
frauc on massive scares was cractiseu against "natives".
The artificial ocuncaries into whicn Africa was carvec. the 
suoseouent oouncary Disputes ana the cansepuent refugee prpc^Ems, 
are weii <nown matters in Africa since the attainment of 
incepe icence.
The aoove are some of the main features of the Roman-Dutcn 
law wnicn was imcorteo into the Caoe Colony in 1652. we proceea to 
examine its operation anc development there.
11
5. Roman-Dutch Law at the Cape
ThR Cape of Good Hope was under the rule of the Dutcn East 
India Company from 1652 to 1795. From 1QD3 there was a Orief period 
of British rule. In the years 1603 to 1606 the Colony was under the 
administration of the Batavian Repuoiic ^Netherlands;. From 1806 
onwards the Cape was under British Administration.
Company rule at the Cape was nign-nanoed. The administration
of justice was unsatisfactory in that memoers of the judiciary
had no legal training. The proceedings of the Court were not open
to the public, ano no reasons for decisions were given. The judges
were often company officials, so that tnere was no independence of
the judiciary from the executive. Criminal procedure was inquisitorial
in form. Torture was commonly practised, especially against slaves,
ano against those sentenced to deatn. oecause it was necessary for
the accused to confess his crime before oeing executed. Common forms
of carrying out the oeath sentence were breaxing on tne uneei. imoaiing.
strangling, Durni.ng, drowning ano smothering. Other penalties i.nciuoec
punishment, imprisonment ano service in cnains on Roooen Isiand as
'Ca puDiic slave for up to 1C or 12 years."
31
The first cargo of slaves was Drought to the Cape in 1658.
By 1708 and 1795 there were 1, 1A7 ana 18, COO slaves respectively.
The indigenous population of Hottentots was suDjecteo to a serviie 
status, while slaves were imported from East Africa, Malaya, ano the 
East Indies. 5ince the Roman-Dutch ^aw did not recognise slavery, the 
ancient Roman law was acpiieo tocetner witn local regulations for 
the prevention cf cruelty to slaves.""
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The majority of the traditional liberties were unknown at
the Cape. The Dutch Reformed Church was the only church allowed.
Catholics were discriminated against and laboured under numerous 
3kdisabilities. There was no freedom of the press and of 
assembly.
The company had a monopoly of commerce with the East Indies.
There was, therefore, no freedom of trade by the company 
servants and by the settlers who arrived later. The economic 
life of the settlement was strictly supervised, and trade with
35the indigenous inhabitants was forbidden or strictly controlled.
The discontent of the settlers against the company rule even led 
to rebellion in February, 1795, just before the British occupation 
of the Colony. ^
Company rule came to an end in 1795. There was a brief period
of Dutch rule in the years 1803 to 1606, but this is an insignificant
period for our purposes. In 1886 the British resumed their
administration of the Colony. It was during the British administration
37that many changes were brought about in the legal system. At 
first it was thought that the Roman-Dutch law shouid be replaced 
entirely by English law. This idea was abanaoned when a 
Commission recommended graaual assimilation of the Colony's laws 
to the English legal system. However certain matters were 
given immediate attention.
The more barbarous punishments, such as breaking on the wheel, 
were abolished in 1797. From 1813 judicial proceedings were to 
be conducted in open court. Freedom of the press was 
established in 1829. Disabilities against Roman Catholics were 
removed in 1829. Slavery was aboiisneo as from December 1, 183A 
by a British Act of Parliament of 1833. The restrictive laws 
□f 1809-19 against Hottentots, were abolished and full rights
13 -
were given to the indigenous population and to peoples of mixed
3S
blood. Public meetings were allowed in 1884.
The most important change which British rule introduced into
the law of the Cape was the British system of government. When
in 1806 Britain took over the Cape and began to make major changes
in the legal system of that Colony, two major principles of the
British constitution - the rule of law and the supremacy of
Parliament - were fully established. The doctrine of the supremacy
of Parliament was first set forth by Blackstone in his Commentaries
on the Laws of England published in 1765. Blackstone's
philosophy was that Parliament was the supreme law-making body;
it could make any law without limitation. This doctrine came to
be fully accepted in Southern Africa. The second doctrine, that
of the rule of law, was an earlier principle dating back to the 
39thirteenth centry. According to Dicey, the doctrine had three
meanings, namely, (1 ) the predominance of regular law in the
running of state affairs as opposed to arbitrary power in the hands
of officials, (2 ) the subjection of all classes of citizens to,
and equality before, the law of the land, and (3) the acknowledgement
that the English common law, together with the right of access co the
courts of justice, was a sufficient guarantee of civil liberties.
There was, therefore, no need for a bill of rights unlike in
other countries. The rule of law together with political
traditions and conventions of the constitution, were a control
mechanism against the improper exercise of Parliamentary 
40
supremacy.
The reforms which the British brought about were not all 
acceptable at the Cape. Those which resulted in a proper judicial 
system were welcomed. But the egalitarian efforts in favour of 
Blacks were resented by the white settlers who had learned to 
enjoy the fruits of slavery and cheap labour. The freeing of 
slaves in 1834 led to the so-called "great trek" by settlers into
1A -
the interior of southern Africa. Dugard informs us that by 1910
when the Union of South Africa was established, no attention was
paid to a dill of Rights even though Parliamentary supremacy was
accepted, the rationale being that in Britain civil liberties were
still well guaranteed even though there was no written Bill of 
A1
Rights. This, Dugard proceeds, was to ignore the fact that
British society was sufficiently homogeneous, there was a long
tradition of respect for civil liberties. These factors were
A2a strong barrier against arbitrary government. South African 
conditions were different. Dugard, commenting on the years 
following the formation of the Union of South Africa, concludes:
"Civil lioerty and the Rule of law were sacrificed 
on the altar of parliamentary supremacy to the 
idol of apartheid. Many British institutions and
A3traditions were discarded by the National Party..."
British influence of the Cape legal system took place by other
indirect- methods. Judges were employed from England, Scotland
ano Ireland; the training of Caoe lawyers was done at British
Universities; English was made the official and, therefore, legal
language at the Cape, and English legal concepts were used in
the drafting of laws. The independent republics which were
established in the interior of Southern Africa by disgruntled
white settlers did not escape this English influence, even before
AAthey became British territory.
The legal system which was received into Basutoland, 
Becnuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland was not pure Roman-Dutch 
law, but a "mixed" system of Roman-Dutch and English law. The 
name "Roman-Dutcn law" is, therefore a mere descriptiption of 
a hybrid legal tradition that developed in Southern Africa.
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It has already been pointed out that English 
consitutianal and administrative law became part of the law 
of the Cape when the British took that colony under their rule. 
Human rights in the form of civil liberties as understood in 
English jurisprudence became part of the Cape law. Today such 
civil liberties form part of the legal systems of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland through the reception process.
1 1 . The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
The constitutional development of the three former High 
Commission Territories from colonial status to independence is 
well known. Uhat is perhaps not so well known is the effect, 
if any, on the three states of the British ratification of 
the European Covention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the European Human Rights Convention). A word of explanation 
should now be said about such effect.
The European Human Rights Convention was signed in Rome on
November A, 1950. It entered into force on September 3, 1953.
46
Britain had ratified the Convention earlier on March B, 1951.
Most of the basic civil and political rights are contained 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also sets up a 
unique enforcement machinery for the rights guaranteed.
47
Under Article 63 (the so-called "colonial" clause)
States party to the Convention may extend its application to any
territories for whose international relations each such state
is responsible. Persuant to that provision several of her colonies
48including Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. In 1967, 
however, Britain informed the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe that Britain would no longer be responsible in respect
45
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of the Convention for Botswana as from September 3D, 1966, and
US
far Lesotho as from October U, 1966. The stated dates were 
the respective days on which independence would be achieved 
by both States. Swaziland became independent on September 
6 , 1966, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
was duly informed about Britain's cessation of responsibility 
in respect of the Convention
Article 66(1) of the Convention provides as follows:
"This Convention shall be open to the signature 
of the Members of the Council of Europe. It 
shall be ratified Ratifications shall be 
deposited with the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe".
By virtue of the above provision the former High Commission
Territories on attaining independence could not become party
to the Convention which is confined to the Council of Europe.
There is no question of the principles of State succession
applying in the case of the Convention even though Britain
51had extended its application to the three States.
That is not the end of the matter, however. The independence 
Constitutions of the three States incorporated Bills of Rights
52modelled along the lines of the European Human Rights Convention.
In Lesotho and Swaziland these Constitutions were removed along 
with the Bills of Rights in 197B and 1973 respectively.^"5 
Botswana retains her Constitution. It is reasonable to speculate 
that in Botswana the Convention will have a continuing influence 
on the jurisprudence of that country. The Courts of Botswana have 
so far relied on English common law in the interpretation of the
5U
civil and political rights as guaranteed under the Constitution. 
5ome rules of the English common law, on the other hand, have been
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subject to interpretation by the European Commission and European
Court, both of which are set up under the Convention, and such
55rules have been found wanting. Such interpretations on the 
English law are likely to be followed in Botswana. A further 
possible development is this that, as Botswana lawyers become 
familiar with the European Convention itself, and as the 
literature on the jurisprudence under that Convention becomes 
readily available, the Courts will be easily persuaded to 
even follow some of the European decisions interpreting provisions 
which are similar to those in the Botswana Constitution.
In Lesotho and Swaziland, where the "Roman-Dutch law" is now
the basis of civil rights, it may at first sight appear difficult
to speculate with confidence that the same will happen as is being
suggested for Botswana. When, however, it is realised that mast
of the guaranteed rights under the European Convention are to a
large extent rights which are known to English common law, it
will be seen that the European Convention may well have some
influence in the long run. Rights such as the protection of
life, the prohibiting of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment,
the prohibition of slavery,servitude and compulsory labour,
protection of liberty, and the security of the person, and access
to justice, are known to the legal systems of Lesotho and
Swaziland'via the reception process. These rights are sometimes
severly restricted by legislation, such as for example in the
57case of the right to liberty. LJhere there are only reasonable 
restrictions "necessary in a democratic society", the European 
Convention is likely to have an effect, provided the legal 
profession is familiar with its provisions and the necessary 
literature is available.
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Another source of influence by the European Convention which is
likely to affect Lesotho and Swaziland is Botswana itself. The Court
decisions of that country are now being published and are, therefore,
being rendered available in Southern Africa. Already there are interesting
decisions interpreting the content of the right to a fair trial within
a reasonable time in criminal matters. It is pointed out in one case that
a too hasty trial is permissible even though it does not afford the
accused time to prepare for his defence; other cases show that delay in
prosecuting a criminal charge entitles the accused to either a complete
acquittal or a reduction in the sentence. These latter cases are likely
to be followed in Lesotho and Swaziland since they provide a remedy
61which is not available in common law jurisdictions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES FDR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN 
BOTSWANA. LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland attained independence in 1966 
(in the cases of Botswana and Lesotho) and 1968 (in the case of 
Swaziland). All three States had similar written Constitutions incorpo­
rating Bills of Rights. The Constitutions of Lesotho and Swaziland 
were abrogated in 1970 (Lesotho) and 1973 (Swaziland). In each case 
the electoral process and the Bills of Rights were jettisoned together
with the Constitution; the law existing just before the coming into
62operation of the Constitutions was revived and/or continued.
When in the 1960's British colonies attained independence with 
written Constitutions, the debate was always whether or not Bills of 
Rights should be incorporated into these instruments. Some States 
rejected the Bills, notable examples being Ghana and Tanganyika. Other 
States, into whose Constitutions the Bills were incorporated subsequently 
rejected the Bills as part of a reaction against constitutional rule.
In the case of Malawi, constitutional means were employed to remove an
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effective Bill of Rights.^ In Southern Africa today Botswana 
stands out as the only Black ruled state which has held onto its 
original constitution.
Why then were these Bills of Rights rejected? Governments and
ruling elites have advanced numerous reasons why Bills of Rights are
unacceptable, reasons which we need not go into here, since they amount
6A
to a basic desire by African leaders for a free hand in government.
The rejection of Westminister-type Constitutions is the rejection of 
limited government. Bills of rights, of course, form part of the 
structure of limited government, and must, of necessity, be jettisoned 
together with the written Constitutions. The British doctrine of 
Parliamentary supremacy has found a fertile ground in Africa. In its 
home ground Parliamentary supremacy is limited by a democratic legislature
and a national ethic which does not tolerate dictatorship, except when
65practised against colonial peoples and Northern Ireland. Even in 
Britain the capacity of the national ethic to deal with new social 
problems brought about by an increasing Black population is in doubt, 
in Africa governments are often not accountable to the citizens, and
the legislative power is utiliseo without limits in the name of
66
"national unity" and "development . Although military take-overs of 
governments are often justified on the ground of preserving liberty, 
each couc tends to be followed by serious inroads into human rights.
in the 1980's all indications seem to support the view that Bills 
of Rights should still be incorporated into written Constitutions. 
Governments never admit that they deny human rights to their nationals, 
even though this is in fact the case. The international community has 
continued to produce standard setting codifications of human rights, 
with the OAU being the latest organization to produce a Convention on
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human rights. Even in Britain, often described as the home of
"true freedom", it is now realised that a new Bill of Rights is necessary,
since the English legal system has been found wanting in Strasbourg.
The failure of human rights in Africa has produced many honest sceptics.
What is the point of a written Bill of Rights which proves to be a paper
67tiger? Judges have been murdered or dismissed for enforcing constitutions
68or for being too independent. These are weighty reasons for which there
are no ready answers, but they are Desides the paint. You do not
abandon the prohibition against murder on the ground that killings
continue to take place. A system of criminal justice operates through
its failure. If there are no breaches, you do not need a catalogue
of offences. To argue against Bills of Rights in this manner is to
69
play into the hands of dictators.
Having made these remarks, we proceed to look into the operation 
of some of the civil and political rights as they operate in Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland. This study is a survey which cannot pretend to 
be an in-depth examination of these rights.
1. Participation in Government
(i) Botswana
The Constitution of Botswana provides for a legislature consisting
70of the President of the Republic and the Mational Assembly, both of
which are elected. The franchise is open to citizens of the age of 21
or aDove who must either have been resident in Botswana for the last
12 months prior to their registration or, having been born in Botswana,
71are domiciled there. Women have the franchise, even though discrimination
against them in respect of the protected fundamental rights is apparently 
72not prohibited.
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The population of Botswana is small in comparison to the land
mass of the territory. It may be wandered whether it might not be
more democratic to lower the age of voters. According to
Mark D. Bomani, a lot of countries have lowered the voter's age
73from 21 to 10 in the last 20 years or so. The process of
elections is an expensive one and should be made worthwhile. Bn the
other hand you do not involve immature voters who may even be largely
illiterate in the electoral process. The government of Botswana has
7Aactually rejected a motion to lower the voters age.
It has been said that in Africa, post-independence elections 
serve only to "confirm the exsting order or to usher in a new order 
approved by the existing order;»75that once the ruling regime is 
threatened by an opposition party, the election results are frustrated. 
This is certainly true of Lesotho in 1970, and probably true as well 
for Swaziland after the 1972 post-independence elections. In Botswana, 
on the other hand, it is difficult to speculate on what would happen 
if there was an opposition party which threatened to bring about a 
change of government.
A major complaint about electoral processes has been the dominating 
position of the government in the running of elections. Electoral 
officers are appointed by the government; the printing of 
ballot boxes is done by the government, ail these to the exclusion 
of the opposition parties. It has, therefore, been said that 
corruption can easily be practised under those circumstances. Hdd 
to these the fact that government Ministers can and do use government 
opportunities to canvass and give out favours under the cover of 
official business. These are valid criticisms in all "democracies" 
of the world. As far as Botswana is concerned we are not able to say 
what the position is. But we should point out that the delimitation 
of constituencies is conducted by a Commission which is appointed by 
the Judicial Service Commission. The Chairperson of the Commission 
is a person who holds or held a high judicial office. The members of
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the Commission snail not nave been active politicians for the
preceding five years, nor oe members of the National Assembly, or
77public servants. The supervision of elections to the National
Assembly is the responsiblity of the Supervisor of Elections appointed
by the FuQlic Service Commission from the public service. He also
acts as a supervisor of Presidential elections. He may appoint
70
assistants in the performance of his functions.
While it may be said that there is a larger measure of independence
from the control. of the Executive as far as the delimitation Commission
is concerned, the same cannot be said of the Supervisor of Elections.
Members of the judiciary invoke a sense of confidence on the part of
the citizenry, while members of the Executive brancn of government
do so to a lesser extent. The issue of the supervision of elections
is a cause of ccmpiaint throughout Africa. The African Experience is
that all kinas of stratagems are employee through the office of the
79
e.zetora. officer to ensure the success or the governing party.
, ii; .esotho
Gne major feature which was left unresGiveo oy the inaependence
Constitution of Lesotho was the question of the status of the King
in the government. One opinion was that the rting shouid have executive
'unctions, including the control of the armed forces, while another
00
was that re shouid Oe a Constitutional monarch. The Constitution 
wouid aopear to nave provided for a compromise solution in that 
there were certain matters in wnicn tne ning hao discretion. But 
on tne whole he was to oe acviseo Dy a Caoinet of Ministers neaaed 
by 3 Prime Minister. This sharing of power between the rting and the 
Prime Minister proved to oe one mistake wnich would later lead to 
tne overthrow of the Constitution. Another problem was, of course, 
tne multi-party system of government. The idea of a passiblity of
an alternative party formino a Government is a popular notion with
51
A f r ic an  ru l i n g  E l i t e s .
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Lesotho attained inoependence in October, 1966 with a Constitution 
similar to that of Botswana except that the Head of Government was the 
King instead of a President. The legislature was composed at the King, 
the National Assemoly and the Senate. The National Assemoly was 
elective, while the Senate was drawn frcm the principal chiefs of 
Lesotho plus some appointees of the King. The franchise was open tc 
ail citizens, regardless of sex, aged 21 or over.
pre-inaependence elections tooK place in April, 1965. The Basotho 
National Party (B.N.P.) was victorious Dy a narrow margin, after 
winning 31 out of a total of 6D constitutencies. The 3.N.F. was a 
minority government since tne party haa captured just over 01% or the
nn
pooular vote. Its rule, therefore, oecame very difficult in the few
years up to 1970. Tne government was always worriEO about acts of
suoversion ana attempts to overtnrow it. Laws which were apparently
contrary to thE Constitution were passea in Graer to suppress any
33possible creaK-acwn of iaw ana order. There was also a major change 
of policy on the part of the B.N.P. Before inoepenaence this party 
n30 supported tne view that the King should have executive powers, 
including the control of tne armeo forces, while the opposition 
BasutoianG Congress Party (B.C.P.; held tne view that the King should 
oe a mere Constitutional monarcn. After inoependence. the B.N.P. 
aoopteo the latter point of view ano vigorously pursued it. The 
experience of power haa taught the B.N.P. that aosoiute control of 
government was essential in order to remain in power particularly
nr •in contemporary Africa.
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The first and last past independence elections took place in January, 
1970. The government was in complete control of the electoral process.
QC
B.M. Khaketla has made a record of the unfair practices of the 
electoral officers in the delimitation of constituencies, the registration 
of voters whereby others were left out deliberately, the employment of
B.N.P. supporters and politically active B.N.P. partisans in the registration 
process, and the secretive manner in which nominations and registration 
took place. This author describes how the Electoral Act of 1968 was 
copied from South Africa and how it provided for a high sum 
of money as a deposit for electoral candidates when the realities of 
Lesotho made it very difficult for the poor candidates to raise the 
deposit. Lastly he mentions the fact that the Electoral Officer ignored 
complaints by opposition parties, and he concludes:
"... the scales had been heavily weighted against opposition 
parties in all respects. IMo wonder a top member of the
B.N.P. remarked: 'How can we lose the match? The ball is
ours; jerseys are ours; the field is ours; the linesmen are 
ours; and more important, the referee too, is ours!
Never did a political party enter an election with as much 
confidence as the B.N.P. "
The opposition B.C.P. won the elections with a comfortable majority of 
36 seats as against 23 seats far the B.N.P. As the results were being 
publicly announced over the government radio, the Prime Minister declared a
state of emergency and suspended the Constitution "pending the drafting
87
of a new one".
The Prime Minister justified his action on the grounds that the 
elections were marked by acts of violence committed against the B.N.P. 
supporters. But on the second and third day of the elections he had
announced that the elections were being "conducted in an atmosphere
88of peace and quiet throughout the country". If there was violence 
against B.N.P. supporters, it is arguable that the criminal law should
- 25
have taken its course and election petitions against improper
practices should have been lodged with the Courts. The Prime Minister
however, went on to say that the action was taken in order to protect
liberty and to prevent chaos. Again if all these justifications could
have been dealt within a constitutional manner there was,
therefore, no cogent explanation for the measure. But the actions
of the government after the elections are significant. The Council
of Ministers, which became the legislature, passed the Office of 
B9King Order 1970 which provided that the King would henceforth act 
according to the advice of the Prime Minister. If he failed to 
do any act in accordance with the Prime Minister's advice, the Prime 
Minister could perform that act which would be deemed to be the act 
of the King. The effect of this law is to take away all executive 
power from the King. The government proceeded to revive or continue 
all laws except the Constitution and therefore Chapter II which provided
for fundamental rights. Emergency regulations which justified the
90 91change together with the Indemnity Order 1970, which protected
government agents against criminal charges and civil suits for
unlawful acts, were passed.
From 1970 to 1973 Lesotho was ruled by the Council of Ministers
(.the former Cabinet) which was also the legislature. In 1973 this body
92passed a law, the Lesotho Order 1973, which constituted the Interim 
National Assembly as the legislature. The main function of this 
Assembly was to act as an interim measure in the process of leading the 
country back to Constitutional rule. The membership of this Assembly was 
as follows:
- 22 Principal Chiefs and Ward Chiefs;
- 60 persons nominated by the King acting on the advice of the 
Prime Minister after consulting such persons as in his opinion 
represent the various shaoes of political opinion in Lesotho;
11 persons nominated by the King acting on the advice of the Prime 
Minister after giving consideration to the desirability of 
nominating persons who have rendered distinguished service to 
Lesotho and who have knowledge of matters affecting various 
interests of the Inhabitants Lesotho.93
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Members of the Assembly must be citizens and be able to speak and 
read the English or the Sesotho language.
Political parties were not allowed to present their own nominees.
This led to disagreements, and some members of parties accepted 
nomination by the Prime Minister.
It is thus seen that, while in Swaziland there had been an effort
9 Ato involve the electorate in the selection of law makers, in
Lesotho the selection was made by the Prime Minister, the assumption being
that he knew what was best for the nation, an assumption which may well
have been true, but which may just as well have been false. The
executive authority was vested in the King who exercised it in
accordance with the advice of a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister was appointed by the King. Other Ministers of
government were appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime
Minister. Ministers need not be members of the Assembly. In his
appointment of a Prime Minister, the King should select a person who
appeared to him to De the leader of the political party which commanded
96
the support of a majority of the members in the Assembly.
The whole arrangement favoured the B.N.P. Another noticeable 
feature was the considerable power which the Prime Minster wielded in 
making appointments. There was no requirement that he should act 
according to the directives of his own political party. He in practice 
appointed former civil servants and opposition party members to be 
Ministers. He also dismissed prominent party members from the Cabinet.
The result was a highly unified Executive whicn was ioyai to the 
Prime Minister, a state of affairs which presumably fostered an 
efficient government.
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The electorate uas not involved in all this. Elections were 
promised for many years; the latest announcement uas that a date 
of elections uould be set by the Interim National Assembly uhen it met 
in 1983.
The arrangement for the administration of Lesotho supported once 
more the theory that in Africa limited government uas objectionable.
The desire uas aluays to have a large measure of freedom of action by 
the Executive branch of government. The process uas similar in Lesotho 
and Suaziland, except that in Lesotho, pouer uas held by a politician 
as against the traditional head of State, uhile in Suaziland the King 
has the pouer. In Lesotho there uas a popular political party uhich uas 
denied pouer; in Suaziland there uas no such party, but the government 
felt threatened sufficiently to take drastic steps. In both cases no 
respect uas shoun to the electorate.
(iii) Suaziland
The history of the relations betueen Suaziland and the colonial 
authority uas, throughout, characterised by the Suazi attitude that 
Suaziland uas never a colony, but a protectorate. Since it uas not 
a colony, the agreements betueen Suaziland and the protectorate 
authority must be respected unless altered by agreement. The various 
Conventions betueen Britain and the South African Republic (Transvaal) 
aluays recognised the independence of Suaziland, so it uas argued.
This attitude persisted throughout the colonial period, and it is 
still a guiding principle for Suaziland in its internal policies and 
international relations.
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British colonial rule did not go along with this attitude.
Swaziland was a colony of the Transvaal and therefore of Britain
as a successor to the rights of the Traansvaal. Swazi claims would
be respected only to the extent of the limits of "indirect rule",
Independence for Swaziland meant, in the view of the Swazi, the
recovery of full sovereignty under a Swazi culture. A Westminister
Constitution was regarded with suspicion as being foreign, imposed by a
colonial power whose rule was characterised by lack of good faith.
Pre-independence negotiations centred on a numoer of issues amongst
which were (1) the return of land under foreign (mainly South African)
ownership, (2) the adjustment of the international boundary with South
97Africa, and (3) the vesting of mineral rights under the King. All
these issues were, and still are, aspects of a larger issue of the
process of reversing the legacy of colonial rule and the restoration of
Swazi nationhood. The symbol of that nationhood is the King to whom
every "Swazi must owe allegiance and snuw loyalty". Matters of human
rights are subjected to the test of Swazi culture and if they fail to
pass it, they are jettisoned. The recovery of land and of territory
is a central policy of State to which matters such as citizenship and
98the struggle against apartheid in Southern Africa must be subjected.
Swaziland attained independence in Septemoer 1968. The written
Constitution for Swaziland was basically similar to the Constitution
of Botswana and Lesotho. The legislature was composed of the King and
Parliament. Parliament consisted of a Senate and House of Assembly.
The membership of the Assembly included popularly elected members and
some appointees of the King. Some Senators were elected by the AssemDiy,
99while others were appointed by the King.
The franchise was open to citizens, regardless of sex, of or above 
the age of 21. The executive authority of government vested in the 
King who was to be advised by a Cabinet of Ministers headed by a 
Prime Minister. In this respect, therefore, the King was a Constitutional
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monarch. The Constitution provided for a multi-party system of 
government, and the King had to appoint as Prime Minister the person 
who commanded the majority in the House of Assembly.
It will be noticed that as far as appointments to the legislature 
were concerned, the King had a lot of say. He could influence the 
composition of the Assembly and Senate to a high degree. The multi-party 
nature of the Constitution meant that the government might be led by 
a party which was not necessarily "loyal" to the King. Such a possibility 
proved to be a major weakness of the Constitution.
Pre-independence elections were held in April 1967. The Imbokodva
National Movement wan all 2A elective seats in the Assembly. Since
this party supported the King, the business of government worked
smoothly with no apposition party to "obstruct" progress. The first
post-independence elections were held in May, 1972. UJhile the
imbokodvo National Movement wan by an overwhelming majority, the opposition
Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (N.N.L.C.) won three seats. One
of the losers on the side of Imbododvo was a P r i n c e . T h e  presence
in the legislature of an opposition party which was not necessarily
"loyal" to the King, and therefore to the Swazi nation, was an
unwelcome irritation. An elected member of the N.N.L.C. was deported
to South Africa as a non-citizen.'^'1' He managed to take the matter
to Court, however, where he obtained a declaration that he was a
citizen. A piece of legislation amending the immigration law so as
to exclude the intervention of the Courts was declared unconstitutional
by the Court of Appeal oecause the amendment purported to establish a
tribunal to decide on issues of citizenship to the exclusion of the
Courts. The Constitution, on the other hand, established the High
Court as a body to interpret the Constitution. To exclude the Court
by ordinary legislation would amount to an amendment of the Constitution
102
which requires the joint sitting of both houses of Parliament.
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The ability of the Courts to intervene effectively with 
legislative and executive functions proved to be another basic 
weakness of the Constitution. To an African government which desires 
a free hand in the running of the government, the powers of the Courts 
were intolerable, calling for drastic action. In April, 1973 the 
Assembly and senate each passed a resolution in which it was 
recommended to the King that the Constitution should be abrogated.
8y a Proclamation dated April 12, 1973 the Assembly and Senate each 
passed a resolution in which it was recommended to the King that the
Constitution should be abrogated. By a Proclamation dated April 12,
1973 the King announced as fallows:
TO ALL MY SUBJECTS - CITIZENS DF SLiAZILAND103
1. Whereas the House of Assembly and the Senate have passed the 
resolutions which have just been read to us.
2.. And whereas I have given grave consideration to the extremely 
serious situation which has now arisen in our country and 
have come to the following conclusions:
(a) that the Constitution has indeed failed to provide the
machinery for good government and for the maintenance of 
peace and order;
(.b) that the Constitution is inoeed the cause of growing 
unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with the state of 
affairs in our country and an impediment to free and 
progressive development in all spheres of life;
(c) that the Constitution has permitted the importation into 
our country of highly undesirable political practices 
alien to and incompatible with the way of life in our 
society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own 
peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic
methods of political activity; increasingly this element 
engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful 
society;
(d) that there is no constitutional way of effecting the necessary
amendments to the Constituion; the method prescribed by
Constitution itself is wholly impracticable and will bring 
about that disorder which any constituion is meant to inhibit;
(e) that I and all my people heartily desire at long last, after
a long constitutional struggle, to achieve full freedom and 
independence under a constitution created by ourselves for 
ourselves in complete liberty without outside pressures; as 
a nation we desire to march forward progressively under our 
own constitution guaranteeing peace, order and good government 
and the happiness and welfare of all our people.
Now therefore I SOBHUZA II, King of Swaziland, hereby declare 
that, in collaboration with my Cabinet Ministers and supported 
by the whole nation, I have assumed supreme power in the Kingdom 
of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
powers is vested in myself and shall, for the meantime, be 
exercised in collaboration with a Council constituted by my 
Cabinet Ministers. I further declare that, to ensure the 
continued maintenance of peace, order and goad government, my 
Armed Forces in conjunction with the Swaziland Royal Police have 
been posted to all strategic places and have taken charge of all 
public services.I further declare that I, in collaboration with 
my Cabinet Ministers, hereby decree that:
a. "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland which 
commenced on the 6th September, 1968, is hereby repealed
b. All laws with the exception of the Constitution 
hereby repealed, shall continue to operate with full 
force and effect and shall be construed with such
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modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions 
as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with 
this and ensuing decrees".
While in Lesotho an analogous move as the one taken by the 
Swaziland government had led to discontent and repression, in 
Swaziland any discontent did not lead to bloodshed. One of the 
first decrees by the new regime provided for preventive detention.^**
The King ruled the country with the assistance of the Council of 
Ministers (the former Cabinet) until 1978 when a Parliament was introduced 
by the Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order 19781^^ 
which commenced its operation in October, 1978. The law established a 
parliament which consisted of a Senate and a House of Assembly. The 
Senate was constitututed by twenty members, ten of whom are appointed 
by the King acting on his discretion, while the other ten are elected by 
the House of Assembly. In making his appointments, the King would 
consult such bodies as may be considered appropriate in an endeavour to 
appoint such persons who are by reason of their special knowledge or 
practical experience able to represent economic, social, or cultural 
interests not already adequately represented in Parliament or who by 
reason of their special merit, are able to contribute substantially to 
the good government of Swaziland.
The House of Assembly consisted of about 51 members. Forty members
were elected by an Electoral College; ten members were appointed by
107the King acting in his discretion. In the exercise of this 
discretion he gave due consideration to unrepresented interests in the 
same way as he did in the appointment of Senators. The Attorney-General 
was a member of the Assembly, but he had no right to vote. If the 
speaker or the Deputy speaker was not a member of the Assembly, he 
assumed membership by virtue of holding that office. The Electoral 
College was restrictea in its election of members of the Assembly.
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Only citizens may be elected, a person who "has served sixty days or more
under an order of Detention issued against him under the Detention Order
103 109
1978" may not be elected. Other disqualifications were the usual ones.
While in other countries there is nothing strange in forbidding non-citizens
from being elected to the legislature, in Swaziland the prooition assumes
a degrees of importance. The citizenship law gives wide discretionary
powers to the Executive branch of government to decide on questions could
find himself being declared a non-citizen and being thereby disqualified
from the electoral process.^^
The King in making appointments did not seem to be restricted to 
citizens. It is provided in section 3A of the EstaPlishment of the 
Parliament of Swaziland Order 1978 that:
"Nothing in section 33 shall be construed as depriving 
the King of the right to appoint any additional members 
to the House as provided for in Part V hereof".
This would seem to imply that the King had a free hand in making
appointments. Indeed there ubs no restriction placed upon the King 
in Part \1 of the Order except that he must make certain consultations.
Persons who have "served sixty days" in Detention may not be elected
to the Assembly. This is formidable a weapon in the hands of the government
against opponents: all that needs to be done is to detain a "troublesome"
person for 60 or more days, and he is immediately disqualified from the
Assemoly. Some leaders of the N.N.L.C. were detained and they were 
1 1 1therefore disqualified.
M e mbers of the Electoral College were elected by popular vote
organised into local communities called Inkhundla (plural Tinkhundla).
112All me m b e r s  of a given Inkhundla above the age of 18, ' p r o v i d e d
3A
they are citizens, are eligible to vote in the election of two 
members of the Electoral College. The two members constituted the 
Electoral College, but the number of the members was not clear.
The elections to the Electoral College were to be conducted
"in accordance with the guidelines and directives laid down by
113
the Electoral Comnittee" set up under the law.
The first elections of the Electoral College were held in 1978.
The Electoral Committees made nominations of candidates, but the
names of nominees were kept secret until the day of voting. No
political campaigning was allowed. Leaders of the N.N.L.C. were
1 1Ain detention during the elections. On election day voting was 
115by public vote. The results were then announced. This manner 
of voting is supposed to be traditional.
It was specifically provided that the Electoral College should
116
elect members of the Assembly by secret ballot. There was no
such provision for secret ballot in the elections of the members of 
the Electoral College, yet these are crucial elections since the 
ordinary citizens are taking part.
Executive authority was vested in the King who may exercise
his powers directly or through officers. While in Lesotho it was
stressed that the King should be advised by the Prime Minister, in
Swaziland there was no such requirement. The Swazi King may
appoint and remove Ministers including the Prime Minister, but
before removing them a report by a tribunal should be submitted to 
117the King on the matter.
The present Constitutuian of Swaziland as established by the 
Order of 1978 demonstrates a desire that Swaziland should be ruled 
according to the traditional culture of that country. The predominance 
of the power of the King is unmistakable; modern political parties,
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which were prohibitied and dissolved by Decree Mo. 9 of the 
12 April. 1973, have no chance of reviving. The population has, 
however, been involved somehow in the business of government, 
unlike in Lesotho. The extent of the freedom felt by voters is, 
however, doubtful in the absence of secret ballot at the vital 
elections for the selection of the Electoral College.
In Botswana the electorate are fully involved in the selection 
of the rulers. In Swaziland the voters have been involved to some 
degree which does not appear to be quite satisfactory. In Lesotho 
the eieccorace were not involved at all.
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2. The Right to Life
It has been said that the right to life is the foundation of all
1 1Q
other rights, since dead persons need no rights. A distinction
has to be made, however, between "the right to life" which is
conveniently classified under civil and political rights, and
"the right to live", which is a part of the economic, social and 
119cultural rights. Our concern here is with the former right.
The nature ana scope of the right to life are not an easy matter
to Oetermine. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that "Everyone has the right to life" (Article 3). In this sense it
120would appear that the right is being conferred. The 
European Convention on Human Rights on the other hand provides that 
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law" (Article 2(1)). 
It seems then that in the case of this Convention the right to life 
is inherent in the human being, but the mechanism far its protection 
is being laid down. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights 
provides as follows:
"Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall 
be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity 
of his person. IMo one may be arbitrarily deprived of 
this right." (Article A).
The matter is laid down admirably in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966:
"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life." (Article 6(1)).
The merit of the definition of the right to life as laid down 
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lies 
in its clarity: the right is inherent, but States parties are 
enjoined to protect it. It remains to look at the method adopted in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
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In Botswana the Constitution follows the method adopted by the
European Convention on Human Rights, though with a different
wording. The right to life is assumed to exist, but the State
is enjoined to protect it. Then follow exceptions to the 
121enjoyment of the right.
In Lesotho and Swaziland we have to look at the common law 
and relevant statutes to see whether the right to life exists.
The common law prohibits the unlawful killing of human beings.
There is in these countries virtually no difference in their law 
and that of Botswana as far as this right is concerned. UJe 
conclude, therefore, that in these States the right to life is 
regarded as inherent.
The next question is that of the scope of "life" itself.
As pointed out by Jacobs, the best place at which to start
122
examining the right to life is at the very beginning of life.
When does life begin? Who is a human being? These are some of 
the questions which should be tackled.
According to the Roman-Dutch law as practised in Holland,
induced abortion was prohibited, but it was not regarded as
murder. The degree of the maturity of the foetus was taken into
account in assessing the appropriate punishment. Induced abortion
was justifiable in only one instance: to save the life of the
mother. The Roman-Dutch law never settled the question of when
a foetus can be said to have a "life", or a "soul" as the influence
123of Christianity would have it.
The Roman-Dutch law as practised in Southern Africa has not 
advanced the position of the law any further. The position taken 
by the English common law that an offence is corrriitted when the 
foetus moves in its mother has not been copied. What is certain in
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modern law in Southern Africa is that the foetus must be alive
for the crime of abortion to be committed by its deliberate 
12A
killing. The question of what a foetus is, nor when it can
125be said to be alive is controversial. There is therefore no 
guide as to the beginning of life. The African Charter on Human 
and People's Rights does not throw any light on this matter.
Other international instrunents on human rights are silent. The only 
exception seems to be the American Convention on Human Rights 
which in Article A( 1 ) provides that the right to life shall be 
protected by law and, "in general, from the moment of conception".
Social and economic problems faced by nations today made a
re-examination of matters of life and death necessary. Southern
Africa is no exception. There is an increasing consciousness that
1 Pf\birth control is an instrument of social betterment of life.
Methods of birth control are now being encouraged. But the effects
of some methods amdunt to abortion, depending dn the view one takes
127about the nature of a foetus. It is in areas such as this that 
the law is unclear.
The legal systems of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland prohibit 
the unlawful killing of human beings. Hilling is permissible in 
the fallowing circumstances:
- in the execution of the sentence of death;
- in self-defence, the defence of any other person or
in defence of property;
- for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or to prevent 
the escape of a person who is under lawful detention;
- in the keeping of law and order;
_ if a death occurs as a result of a lawful act of war.
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These are the only permissible exceptions to the prohibition againt 
killing. Suicide is not prohibited. An accomplice of a suicide 
would however, be guilty of murder.
The law as described above leaves a number of outstanding
problems. First, "mercy killing" (euthanasia) is prohibited, but
it would appear that the scope of this is not clear. Does a medical
doctor have a duty to keep alive a human vegetable? Does he do wrong
if he abstains from assisting a fatally injured person? It may
well be that according to medical ethics he does right or wrong, but
120
the law is not clear on these matters.
Second, a basic question amongst Black people in Southern Africa
is about the degree of freedom which expectant mothers or future
parents have aver the life and death of the foetus. There are various
circumstances which could lead to a desire to terminate a pregnancy.
Many married women get pregnant through illicit sexual relations
because of the migratory labour system, and such pregnancies and
births of illegitimate children are the cause of violence and
family disunity. A pregnancy could occur through a crime such a
rape. It could be the pregnancy of an imbecile or a lunatic.
The future mother could be a girl of a tender age whose health
and future welfare could be in jeopardy. Sometimes the welfare
of the future child could be a bleak one, or there could be a risk of
it being born deformed. It could be a pregnancy resulting from a
failed contraceptive device. In all these cases the Roman-Dutch law
does not permit the termination of the pregnancy, unless the mother's 
129
life is in danger.
The termination of pregnancy presents problems which face, 
not only the future mother or future parents, but the medical 
profession as well. A developed system of law should tackle them.
The Roman-Dutch law permits a termination of a pregnancy only when 
there is a risk to the life of the mother. If she is agreeable to 
a termination of the pregnancy, the next question is whether she 
alone has the discretion to consent to that termination. If she 
is married the husband has an interest in the pregnancy, but he 
does not face the risk of death. Should he refuse his consent? If 
he does refuse, and a doctor performs the necessary operation, is 
the doctor liable in a suit for damages? The questions are being 
posed, not for the purpose of providing an answer to them, but in 
order to highlight the dilemma presented by matters of life and 
death, and to show that our countries' legal systems are backward, 
and there cannot be hope for the full enjoyment of human rights 
within the present state of affairs.
(i) Botswana
The Death Sentence
In Botswana the death sentence is not prohibited. It can be
130imposed in tne case of murder without extenuating circumstances.
A convicted person can appeal to the President for pardon. The
131President exercises his powers of pardon through a Pardons Committee.
There are, therefore, two techniques in the legal system for 
reducing the number of death sentences, namely the finding of 
extenuating circumstances and the appeal for mercy. Research still 
has to be done as to how effective these techniques are. It does 
appear that death sentences are rare. Pregnant women may not be 
e x e c u t e d . I n f a n t i c i d e  does not normally carry a death sentence. 
Abortion is not regarded as homicide.
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Death sentences are ordered, supervised and carried out by 
hunan beings. Since the Constitution of Botswana forbids subjection 
to "torture or to inhunan or degrading punishment or treatment", 
it may be asked whether it is perhaps subjecting the public officials 
who carry out death sentences to inhuman or degrading punishment by 
obliging them to carry out death sentences.
(ii) Lesotho
In Lesotho the death sentence is mandatory for the crime of
murder without extenuating circumstances, and discretionary in
135cases of treason and rape. Where there are aggravating circumstances 
in a conviction for murder, the extenuation may be ignored.
Death sentences have in practice been imposed for murder only, 
and not for treason or rape. In cases of treason convictions, which 
have become so common since 197Q, the learned admonition of the 
Roman-Dutch writer, Johannes Van der Linden, has been followed.
He wrote thus concerning sedition:
"As, .however, the orgin of this crime is often found in 
the different opinions respecting the measures of Government, 
especially when the latter has been affected by revolutions 
having taken place, there is hardly any crime in which 
greater caution is to be enjoined upon a judge, so as 
on the one hand to preserve the maintenance of peace 
and good order, and on the other hand not to render anyone
the unfortunate victim of political dissensions by
136excessive severity."
The Courts of Lesotho have so maintained this attitude towards 
treason that a call for reform in the political situation in Lesotho 
was made in a recent conviction for treason:
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"Are the Basotho to live with this kind of situation 
for a long time? Is the commission of High treason 
going to be allowed to occur with regularity until it 
becomes their normal way of life? ... In inflicting 
punishment the courts also look at the trouble because if 
that can be cured then the repetition of the commission of 
the crime in question will be nil. Those who have the 
power to regularise the situation had better, for the
sake of the Basotho, consider what has been said above,
137urgently".
Rape cases are in practice tried by subordinate courts. Although 
there has never been a death sentence for rape, a judge of the High 
Court recently said that rape was on the increase that the time 
might soon come when rape cases would be tried by the High Court so 
as to protect the insecure women who are left by their menfolk who 
go to urban areas and South Africa in search of employment. And 
he warned that:
"Accused persons who are found guilty of this heinous 
crime'must not expect any mercy from our Courts.
Potential rapists have oeen warned. The courts mean
.... „ 136to crush this menace.
Despite this well-intentioned aim, sentences for rape are on the 
whole lenient in Lesotho. In this very case in which Justice Mofakeng 
sounded a warning, a policeman who had committed rape on a nursing 
mother prisoner at a police station, had been sentenced to 2 years 
imprisonment which was confirmed by the judge.
In practice the death sentence for murder is not a common penalty.
Courts have easily found the existence of extenuating circumstances;
139aggravation is rarely found to cancel extenuation. In Rex v. Kgpo 
the accused, a sergeant in the Police Mobile Unit, planned ana executed 
the murder of the boyfriend of his cousin. Upon his conviction, it was
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found that he was sterile and that this condition led to jealousy and
envy for the deceased and his ability to procreate. Although the
accused uas a senior police officer uho should have knoun better
than tD commit such a serious offence, his life uas spared and he
uas sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. In the trial for murder of
Lieutenant Colonel Phaloane the High Court found extenuation in the
140
fact that the crime uas not premeditated. On appeal the Court
of Appeal uas highly critical of this finding, pointing out that
there uere in the case serious aggravating circumstances uhich should
have led to the supreme penalty. The sentence uas increased from
141
10 to 15 years imprisonment.
Convicted murderers may appeal for clemency from the King uho
142
is advised by a Pardons Committee in taking decisions. The 
proceedings of the Committee are not public and their scrutiny is 
difficult. Yet the Committee performs an important function in the 
protection of the right to life. To a casual observer some 
decisions of this Committee are contradictory. Four recent decisions
may serve to illustrate this opinion. In the tuo cases of Seilo
143 1^4Lemohane and Others and that of Thaoanq Mohlalisi and Others
the motive for the murder uas robbery from a shon. In each case
the night uatchman uas rendered helpless by tying him up uith a
piece of uire. In the first case the uatchman died of strangling
since the uire uas tied recklessly around his neck so as to cause
choking from the victim's struggles. In the second case a piece of
cloth had been pushed into the mouth of the uatchman and it caused his
death. The accused uere in each case sentenced to hang. Their appeals
145
for clemency uere turned doun.
146
The second set of cases is that of Khoabane Sello and that 
147of Lekena Moshephi and Others. In the former case the accused uas 
a former employee in the postal services, and he uas familiar uith 
the procedures for the delivery of mail. He uaylaid the postal courier,
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who used to travel on horseback, and, after killing him, robbed
him of the postal bag. Death was due to five stab wounds on the
victims chest which penetrated the heart and lungs. The trial 
judge found that, "In all there were no less than eighteen stab 
wounds to his chest". The accused was sentenced to death. But
1A5
on appeal to the King, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
In the second case the victim set out on horseback from Matatiele 
in South Africa for Lesotho, in search of missing animals. He was 
invited by one of the accused to a cattlepost where he spent the night.
During the night he was assaulted by two of the accused. A witness 
described a horrible attack an the deceased by the accused on the 
following day. The four accused were eventually convicted of murder
1A5and sentenced to death. Their pleas for mercywere accepted by the King.
Now the contradiction in the two sets of cases lies here: In the robbery
cases, the desire of the accused persons was to disade the victim 
so that he did not interfere with their illegal acts. But death 
resulted because the accused were reckless as to whether the victim 
died or survived. There was never any prior plan to kill the victim.
In the second set of cases, there was premeditation. Khoabane Sello 
laid his plans very well. (He claimed, but was not believed, that 
he was with an accomplice). In the second case a stranger arrived 
on the scene and a plan to kill him was immediately set into motion 
and executed with cruel brutality. If mercy was to be extended to 
any of these murderers, it should have been to the convicts in the 
first set of cases, or rather to all of them.
The impression created about Lesotho so far is that there is a 
reasonable respect for life. That impression is in fact not correct 
as is immediately shown. Most deaths in Lesotho occur during the 
preservation of the security of the State and in the suppression of 
disorder. From 1970 during the state of emergency and in 197A many 
lives were lost at the hands of the police. One writer has said that
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during these times the police tended to shoot first. Over the
years one notices the development of a certain cynicism towards the
sanctity of life. Another development is the attitude of the
government of bringing itself down to the level of criminals:
since the enemies of the government kill, so the argument goes,
the government shall da likewise. In other words "terrorism" shall
149be met with "state terror". Governments who are worthy of the title 
do not act in that way.
The right to life implies that there is a duty an the State to
protect life and to punish those who violate it, including the agents
of the State. This right imposes on the State a duty to inquire into
the death of every person, so that if anyone is responsible he should
be punished. The inquest law provides the machinery for this purpose.
Vet in Lesotho one noticed the progressive failure to comply with
150the provisions of the Inquest Proclamation. One never heard of
inquests into deaths occuring during security operations. Deaths were
announced and bodies displayed to demonstrate the successes of
the security forces, but no inquiries were ever instituted to determine
151the actual circumstances of death. In this way many murders could 
be committed.. The possiblity of homicide in the hands of the police 
may be illustrated by one recent example.
In August 1961 the popular blind South African singer, Steve Kekana, 
staged a concert in Lesotho. Apparently too many tickets were sold 
so as to exceed the capacity of the music hall. Tickets holders 
demanded to get in and some disorder developed. The police came upon 
the scene and threw teargas canisters into the hall. A stampede 
developed. When it was over, 17 young persons lay dead on the scene. 
Radio Lesotho suddenly defended the police action as being necessary 
to preserve law and order. The organiser of the concert held a
1^6
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different vieu: he said the police action had been unnecessary and
152the police were responsible for the deaths. To someone uho uas 
not present at the scene, it uould appear that it uas most dangerous 
to explode teargas in a crouded hall; a sensible thing to do uould 
have been to deal uith the croud outside the hall. The important thing 
houever, is that an inquest should have been held to determine responsibility 
for the deaths. None uas held. In some countries a tragedy such as 
this one uould have been the subject of a commission of inquiry.
A number of mysterious deaths occured in 1961. In June, Odilon
Seheri , a prominent citizen vanished after attending a meeting. His
burnt body uas discovered about a ueek later in the mountains of Lesotho.
un September 4, the home of Ben Masila, a critic of the government, uas
attacked. He escaped,but his grandson uas killed in the attack.
Masilo later charged that his attackers uere members of the Police Mobile
Unit. On September 7, Edgar Motuba together uith his visitors,
Osiel Mohale and Lechesa Koeshe, uere taken auay by a group of men uho
said they uere policemen. Their dead bodies uere discovered the foilouing 
153day. Edgar Motuba uas the editor of Leselinyana La Lesotho, a church
neuspaper uhich uas critical of the government. Other deaths subsequently 
154took place. Outstanding amongst these uere the assassinations of
155Chakela, a prominent politician in July 1962, and that of Jobo Rampeta,
156a government Minister, in August 1982. At the scene of the killing 
of Jobo Rampeta an armed dead body uas discovered, and the government 
named the person as the assassin of Chakeia and Rampeta, Out only after 
displaying him to the public for purposes of identity. It uas not knaun 
hou he had met his death, the government said.
Public interest demands that the cause of the deaths of these 
and other people must be established, so that those uho are responsible 
can be dealt uith according to lau. So far only the inquest into the 
death of Odilon Seheri uas conducted as from Monday 20 December, 1982.
It is not as if inquests are useless. In the inquiry into the death
of Bassie Mahase it uas discovered that he had in fact been murdered 
by a very senior police officer, Lieutenant Colonel Phaloane, head of
157
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the Criminal Investigation Department, who was eventually convicted 
of the murder, despite attempts by the police to conceal the circumstances
of the killing which had at first been labelled a killing in a road
. 158 accident.
Deaths in Detention
In South Africa, a neighbour of Lesotho, deaths of political
detainees are a common occurrence. Such deaths are in fact
condoned by the State. In Lesotho such deaths had all along been
unknown. In November 1981 the first death of a detainee under the
159
Internal Security Law occurred. The victim was 5etipa Mathaba.
No inquest into his death has been held as of December 1982.
The second death in detention accured in Septemoer, 1982. This was
the death of Sophie Makhele who allegedly shot herself to death with
a police firearm left in her detention cell. No inquest was held, 
yet the circumstances of her death as related by the police were 
so simple. "Disappearances"
The phenomenon of "disappearance" is well known in regions such
160as Latin America and parts of Africa. The nature and scope of 
"disappearance" is still to be defined. Not every person who vanishes 
can be said to have "disappeared." "Disappearances" invariably 
involve governments and their agents during the process of eliminating 
their political opponents by extra legal means. An Amnesty International 
report classifies the "disappeared" into four categories in respect of 
the Americas:
(1) those released after a short time (from one day to 30 days).
The authorities never admit responsibility for this kind
of short-term disappearance;
(2 ) those transferred to an official prison after the initial 
period of disappearance;
(3) those murdered, and whose bodies are found;
(A) those who disappear indefinitely and are believed to be
161dead or in secret detention camps.
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The phenomenon of "disappearances" was all alcng unknown in Lesotho.
When, however, Odilon Seheri vanished only to be found burned to death;
when Edgar Motuba and his companions were abducted and re-appeared as
dead bodies, one could observe the beginnings of the phenomenon of
"disappearance". There was just one missing link: possible government
involvement. Responsible citizens expected government to do
something about the deaths, especially because, before his death,
Edgar Motuba had given details of threats to his life by members of 
162the Police Mobile Unit. And a High Court judge had sounded a 
warning in connection with the law providing for detention without 
trial in which relatives and lawyers were excluded from the detainee:
" ... this is what an ordinary Mosotho fears, namely, that
he can vanish from the face of the earth at the whim of
some petty police officer for reasons other than those
stated in the Act. This again can easily happen when
one remembers how many of these detainees are ever
163
heard of in these Courts."
That was in February, 1980. Then in November 5, 1981 it happened.
Jobo Khalane and his brother, Paseka, were arrested by members of
the Police Mobile Unit and taken to the Roman Catholic Mission at
164Pontmain in northern Lesotho. At 4 p.m. the following day Paseka 
was driven away and left in the "middle of nowhere" to find his way 
home. Jobo remained; he has not been heard of ever since. In an 
application by his wife for his release, the government's reply was 
surprising for its simplicity and arrogance: Jobo was suspected of
engaging in subversive activities; he was arrested; he requested to 
be accompanied by his brother, which request was granted; when the 
interrogation of the brother was over he was driven to a bus stop so 
that he could catch a bus home. Jobo himself remained because his 
interrogation was not complete. He was found not to have engaged in 
any subversive activities and released. He was driven to the same bus
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stop at 6 p.m. to catch a bus home. Since he uas not in police 
custody, the police could not produce Jobo Khalane. Houever,
165
inquiries had been mounted to find Jobo, but uithout success.
The Court ordered the police to release Jobo. The order uas not 
complied uith.
In a recent report on Guatemala by Amnesty International there 
appears the testimony of a former conscript in the Guatemalan Army 
uho uas reported as saying:
"So uhat I mean is, you kill, then you return; you get 
dressed. You've maybe committed these crimes in army 
uniforms; if so, they tell you to get out of those clothes 
fast and put on civilian clothes or police clothes, then 
go out and look for uhoever killed the person.
But hou are ue supposed to find them if it uas us uho did 
it in the first place? ... They say "unknoun persons" 
killed the student and that today they are being sought 
by the police; but hou can they find them if the people
166
uho did it are the people going out to do the searching?"
The second case of "disappearance" is that of IMkau Matete uho uas
167fortunate enough to "re-appear" alive.
16B
In September, 1982 a neu Internal Security Act came into
effect. It facilitated arrests and detentions. This lau, together
uith the indemnity legislation, provided for a fertile ground for
169
torture, "disappearances" and secret detention centres.
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(iii) Swaziland 
Death Sentence
The law of Swaziland is basically similar to that of Lesotho on
this matter. The death sentence is mandatory for murder without
extenuating circumstances.^^ Infanticide is often treated as
culpable homicide. Pregnant women may not be executed. Persons
who are aged 18 or below when they commit the homicide are not 
171to be sentenced to death.
172The sentence of death is discretionary for treason. There 
is no mention of the death sentence for rape.
It appears that death sentences have been imposed for ritual
muders which are a problem in Swaziland. In July 1981 eight persons
173were executed for this crime. Murder convicts were excluded from
17Athe amnesty granted in Septemder 1981 to more than 650 prisoners.
On the whole it appears that the death sentence is in practice 
restricted to ritual murders so far.
It does not appear that there have Oeen deaths in detention 
in Swaziland. "Disappearances" are not known, and the detention 
law does not facilitate such "disappearances" since it is in the 
nature of a preventive detention law.
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3. Right to Personal Liberty
In all three countries under discussion the right to personal 
liberty is largely based an the English Common Law. Article 3 of 
the Constitution of Botswana provides guarantees against arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and sets out the conditions under which 
a person may be deprived of his liberty and sets out the rights
of persons under detention. These guarantees are provided for in
175the Criminal Procedure laws of all three countries, which laws 
existed even before independence.
Deprivation of liberty may be divided into two categories:
(1) legitimate or acceptable arrest and detention,
(2) illegitimate or unjustified arrest and detention.
Depending on the values of each community, a State which engages in 
the second form of deprivation of liberty is regarded as oppressive. 
Legitimate forms of deprivation of liberty include arrests for 
bringing criminal suspects to justice and for punishing them; detentions 
for the purpose of educating minors; detentions for preventing the 
spread of infectious diseases, or for the treatment of lunatics; 
temporary detentions in the interests of State security and the maintenance 
of law and order; and arrests and detentions for the purpose of enforcing 
immigration and aliens control laws. In all these cases there should 
be a provision for access to justice and control by judicial or 
quasi-judicial bodies. Detentions which do not satisfy these conditions 
are regarded as illegitimate.
Legitimate detentions would not normally be a subject of critical 
discussion were it not for the fact that the powers for such detentions 
are often abused. Thus, for example, ordinary criminal detainees 
are often not taken to a judical officer within the time limits laid down;
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the power to detain has often been used for the purpose of torture 
and extraction of unlawful confessions. The abuse of power occurs 
not only in respect of legitimate arrests and detentions, but also 
in respect of the category of legislation for unjustified deprivation 
of liberty. In the discussion which follows we pay special attention 
to abuse of authority and to legislation for unjustified deprivation 
of liberty.
(.i) Botswana
Detention Without Trial
There are not in Botswana laws for detention without trial such 
as are founo in Lesotho and Swaziland. During a state of emergency 
however, measures, including the deprivation of liberty may be taken 
to deal with that situation. In the case of detention during a state 
af emergency the detainee has the following rights:
(1) he shall, within 5 days, be furnished with written reasons
for his detention;
(2) th'e fact of his detention shall be published in the Gazette 
within 1A days, giving particulars of the provision of
law under which the detention is authorised;
(3) his case shall be reviewed regularly by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law and presided over by 
a lawyer appointed by the Chief Justice;
(A) he shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult and
instruct a legal representative;
(5) he shall be permitted to make written or oral representations
or both to the tribunal either by himself or through a legal
«. 176representative.
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All detentions are subject to the remedy of habeas corpus. In
the case of Mtetwa v. Officer Commanding, State Prison, Lobatse, and 
177Others, the applicant, Mtetwa, was for a long time the holder of 
a Botswana passport and he was resident there. The immigration 
authorities removed his passport from him, and then detained him as 
an alien pending his removal from Botswana. He petitioned the High 
Court which declared his detention unlawful since he had been allowed 
into Botswana even before independence. He could not be removed from 
there as a prohibited immigrant. In his judgement Mr. Justice 
Rooney had an opportunity to explain that the Roman-Outch law remedy 
of the writ de homine libero exhibendo was similar to the English 
law writ of habeas corpus.
The remedy of habeas corpus is not a useful remedy against a
determined government. Detained persons have no access to the Courts
except with the permission of the authorities. Unless a detainee has
a relative who is able and willing to take up the matter of the
detention, the detainee could be prejudiced. The immigration law
has been utilised for the purpose of holding refugees for long periods
and for returning them to their country of origin. In 1971 several
refugees from Rhodesia were held for some two years while arrangements
170were being made for their return to Rhodesia. In March 1973
UZ of them were forcibly repatriated to Rhodesia. Some of them were
taken into custody by the Rhodesian authorities, while others escaped.
In January 19B1 A South African refugees were detained and forcibly 
180returned to South Africa. In both cases, and others, the detainees 
might have had a course of action based, for example, on Botswana's 
participation in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its Protocol. But since they were shut up in a strange country there 
was no hope for redress for them.
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Pre-trial Detentions
The procedure for arrest and the bringing of suspects for trial
is laid down in the procedure code. Arrested persons must be
10 1
brought for trial as soon as passible. If not tried immediately
they must either be released unconditionally or on bail, or else the 
Court must authorise their continued detention especially in respect 
of serious offences.
In Botswana there is a realization that arrest and detention amount 
to punishment. Time spent in custody is, therefore, taken into account
in assessing sentence. There have been instances of prisoners being
held in police custody longer than the permissible period of 48 hours
- ID T
as happened in The State v. David Modukwe.
(ii) Lesotho
Detention Without Trial
Prior to 1974, apart from emergency regulations, there was no
103law for detention without trial. In 1974 an amendment to the 
Internal Security (General) Act 1967 provided for 60 days' detention 
for purposes of interrogation. That period could be renewed from 
time to time. This meant that the detention could be indefinite, 
even though the law was never meant to be a preventive detention 
measure. Detention was to be effected on the written authority of 
the Commissioner of Police; such order was to be displayed to the 
intended detainee.
In this law there was never a provision for the publication of 
the fact of detention; close relatives, friends or lawyers did not 
have to be informed of such a detention. In this way the law 
encouragea "disappearances". A person could be detained without 
anybody knowing about it. In addition access to the detainee, except 
by a Magistrate, was prohibited.
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The provisions of the 197A amendment were vigorously enforced.
Several persons were detained, but their number or names were not
published. The application of the law was characterised by abuse.
By the end of the 197Q's petitions concerning this law began to 
1BAbe filed with the Courts. All along it had been thought that
the jurisdiction of the Courts was completely ousted. This 
impression was, however, mistaken.
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In the case of Sella v. The Commissioner of Police and Others 
the detainee was severely assaulted within four days of her detention. 
She had to be taken to hospital where she spent most of the detention 
period. On a petition for her release, the Court explained the nature 
and scope of the detention provisions of the law. Among other things 
the Court held that the hospital was not a detention centre since the 
Commissioner had not designated it as such. The Court ordered the 
Magistrate to obtain a statement from the detainee. Although this 
statement was hearsay, it was accepted in evidence because the 
liberty of the citizen was at stake. The doctor who examined the 
detainee was asked to prepare a report which was accepted in evidence, 
something which the rules of evidence do not permit. But since 
liberty was in issue, it was accepted in evidence. The government 
argued that, since the doctor was not permitted access to a detainee, 
his report (being about a detainee) was illegally obtained. This 
argument was rejected. It was found that the Commissioner did not 
deliberate upon eacn and every detention, but that he signed cyclo- 
styled detention orders in blanx. Some police officer would then 
fill in the name of an intended detainee. Commenting on this practice 
the judge said:
"I can only hope, therefore, that these presigned forms are 
not available at every charge office in this kingdom, and 
are not being used in connection with detaining persons for
purposes other than those actually specified in the Act,
1o7for that would clearly be illegal".
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From the hospital the detainee had been moved to a different 
detention centre. The Court found that the Commissioner had not 
deliberated upon this removal - a cyclostyled form had been filled 
in - and declared the detention illegal. Throughout the judgement 
the Court emphasised the fact that it had a right to test the legality 
of the detention, to see whether the provisions of the law had been 
observed.
The case of Sello led to others, and more abuses were revealed.
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In Nkau Matete v. Minister in Charge of Police and Others, it 
was revealed that the detainee had been detained twice. In each case 
there was no detention order authorising his detention, and the 
Magistrate never visited him, and he was detained for more than 60 
days. In short he was made to "disappear".
The law was also used for purposes other than those stated in
its provisions. In Lebenya Makaxole v. Commissioner of Police and 
109Another the detentions were for the theft of motor cars. In
190Jessy Ramakatane and Another v. Rex, the detentions were for
robbery. In other cases the detention centre was not specified, so
191
that the police were able to move a detainee about. In other cases
the detention orders were vague, not sufficiently informing the
192detainee about the reasons for his arrest.
The Internal Security (General) Act of 1967 was repealea in
193
September 1982, and replaced by a new Act with a similar name.
19A
Section 32 A of the repealed Act was not repealed. This
section provided for the imnunity of government and its agents 
against criminal sanctions and civil suits for wrongful conduct in 
the protection of the state security. The outstanding features of 
the new measure may be summarised as follows:
0?
- it created offences against subversion and sabotage and
related offences directed against the State and persons.
Knowledge of intended subversion and sabotage coupled
195with a failure to report, were made an offence,
the application of the law was extra-territorial, covering
acts which take place abroad. The Lesotho High Court was
196given the necessary jurisdiction to try such offences;
- it established the presumption of guilt against those who
197were charged with offences under it,
- the police were given wide powers to stop persons and search
them, to enter homes and other places for a similar purpose.
It was specifically provided that the police may stop and
search a person to satisfy themselves as to his identity and
that he was not carrying offensive weapons or substances etc.
196It was no longer necessary for the police to be suspicious.
- it provided for detention without trial for up to 42 days on
one occasion while the detainee is being transferred from
one official to another at 14 days' intervals for the purpose
199of investigating and prosecuting subversive activity;
the re-arrest of the detainee may only be for a different cause,
- the institution of "adviser" was established to advise the
Minister on the need for the release or continued detention
of a person during the detention. The "advisers" were
appointed by the Minister in his discretion. The "adviser"
201had access once every week to the detainee.
- there was finally a provision for the banning and unbanning
p  202of organizations.
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Some observations can be made. Access to a detainee would be open 
to an "adviser", instead of a Magistrate. By December 1902 no such 
advisers had been appointed, yet the law came into force on September 
ID, 1902. There was a provision for continuity from the old law to 
the new one. Detainees who already existed were automatically taken 
over by the new law. But there was no provision that Magistrates 
will be "advisers". This would imply that all such detainees were 
being held illegally in the absence of "advisers". It was then 
reasonable to speculate that "advisers" be political appointees who 
lack the necessary independence to combat abuse.
Forty-two, not sixty, days was the maximum period of detention. 
This may seem to be an improvement on the law in favour of liberty. 
This was however, illusory. Detention was divided into 3 stages, 
namely
- stage 1: initial detention, which could be effected by
any policeman regardless of rank;
- stage 2: interim custody on the orders of the Comissioner
of Police;
- stage 3: detention order, i.e. detention on the orders of
the Minister.
Each stage was for 1A days. Since this law was for interrogation
purposes, the crucial stage was the initial detention. It was during
this stage that deaths and torture could take place. It is to be
noted that the detainee in the case of Sella was assaulted in the
203first four days of her detention. Available information suggests 
that Sophie Makhele "shot" herself very early in her detention. Past 
experience, therefore, supports the view that the early days of 
detention were used for purposes of interrogation, for torture and 
even death. Yet this was the time when the "adviser" could not have
access to the detainee. The "adviser" comes in only at stage 2
, 20Aonwards.
- 59
Section 30(2) provided that a person who was in detention under 
an interim custody order (stage 2) and in respect of whom no detention 
order (stage 3) was made within 1A days should be freed. He may only be 
re-arrested for a fresh set of facts. This was to stop the harassment 
of a detainee. This, however, was partial protection. Policemen 
were able to harass detainees by means of initial detentions. All 
they had to do was to keep a detainee for, say, 10 days and release him. 
They could then arrest him on the same facts, since section 30(2) would 
not apply in that case.^^
The new law did not specifically provide that the place of detention
should be stated in the detention order. The old law did, and a number
of Court decisions turned an this issue. A convenient practice then
was for the police to move a detainee about from place to place,
including a hospital. The Courts overruled this practice. The new
law took account of past experience and built on it to legalise the
very abuses which the Courts disapproved of. The inclusion of a hospital
206as a place of detention overruled the Sella case. According to the
new law, the Minister may give directions as to the place of detention.
The implications were serious. A fertile ground for "disappearances"
and secret detention centres had been laid. It will be recalled that
Jnbo Khalane "disappeared" from a Roman Catholic Mission which was not
207known to be a detention centre. The moving about of detainees was 
sanctioned and it became difficult to trace them. Since the fact 
of detention need not be published, those detainees who were arrested 
in secret became easy victims of "disappearances".
One common abuse concerning the old law was for the police to
208
simply fail to inform a Magistrate about the existence of a detainee.
In the new law the "adviser" was substituted for the Magistrate, but 
there was no provision for ensuring that the "adviser" would in every 
case be advised of the existence of a detainee. But, as already stated, 
the initial detention for 1A days did not involve the "adviser", and 
this reduced the need to call him in.
- bU
The police are still protected against criminal and civil 
suits in terms of section 32A of the 1967 Act. liihat is puzzling is 
why section 32A was not incorporated into the new law.
Finally it should be mentioned that the police were given wide
powers to stop and search persons, to enter homes and other places for
a similar purpose. It was specifically provided that the police may
stop and search without warrant any person to satisfy themselves as
to his identity and that he was not carrying offensive weapons or
substances. There was no need for the police to have suspicion,
or reasonable suspicion. The initial detention may be effected
"without warrant" but on reasonable suspicion by a member of the
"police force". The term "police force" has a wide meaning in Lesotho,
209for it includes police volunteer reserves. A detainee can, therefore, 
be kept in detention for 14 days by the "peace corps"!
Pre-trial detentions
The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act provided for the machinery 
for bringing' suspected offenders to justice. Arrested persons were to 
be brought to a Magistrate within 48 hours of their arrest excluding the 
time spent an the journey to the Court. Otherwise they should be 
released. Arrests were generally to be effected on reasonable suspicion.
In practice the 48 hour time limit was ignored. Prisoners have 
been known to be held by the police for several weeks. The main 
reason seemed to be that arrests are made too early in the investigation 
process. The other reason was that the period in police custody was 
used in attempts to extract illegal confessions from detainees through
the process of torture and ill-treatment. The cases of Rex v.
210 211 
Mphulenyane and Two Others and Rex v. Faku and Others will serve
to illustrate these abuses.
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In the former case, one suspect was arrested by the police on 
January 20, 1977. The other two suspects were arrested on Februrary 
3, 1977. Only on February 25, were all three detainees taken to the 
Magistrate on a charge of murder, and this was only after the first 
suspect had made a "confession" the previous day. All three accused 
gave evidence during the trial that they had been severely assaulted 
by the police, and they were believed; the "confession" was rejected.
In the latter case one accused was detained for 13 days during which time 
he was forced to admit guilt. Suddenly on the 13th day he "confessed". 
The "confession" was subsequently rejected by the Court.
All sorts of explanations were used by the police in attempts to 
justify illegal detentions and to avoid the provisions of the law.
In the case of Mphulenyane referred to above, the police said the 
first detainee was not "arrested" on January 2D; he was just 
"assisting" the police in the investigations. There passed a month 
before the detainee was taken to Court. This was explained on the 
ground that a Magistrate was not available, which was false because 
the trial Court ordered the production of the Magistrate's records 
which showed that there was a Magistrate throughout. The police then
212said they had not completed their "interrogations", hence the delay.
213The Swaziland case of Barrtiies v.A. iMithianadan comes to mind at 
this juncture. That was a petition for the release of a witness in 
a murder investigation. The Attorney-General argued that the provisions of 
the procedure coue did not apply because the witness had not been 
"arrested" but had been "detained", which was not forbidden by the 
law. This argument was rejected.
In Lesotho witnesses were also kept in police custody while
investigations took place. An accampij.ce witness was held over
a long period in the recent ritual murder trial in Rex v. Manamalela 
21A
and Others. Yet another practice was where suspects are "warned"
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to report periodically at a police station, or to remain in their 
village. Although such an order uas illegal, the victim of it dared 
not disobey it for fear of retaliation by the police.
Delay in bringing cases up for trial uas a big problem in Lesotho. 
Many accused persons remain in custody for several months uhile 
auaiting trial. The average murder trial takes over one year to be 
disposed of.
Ciii) Suaziland
Detention uithout Trial
Detention uithout trial uas first introduced in Suaziland in April 
1973. Immediately after the King announced that he uas assuming 
supreme authority, he called upon the Attorney-General to read out 
"further decrees designed to provide for the continuance of 
administration, essential services and normal life in our country". 
Decree No. 2 read as follous:
"For a period of six months from date hereof, the 
King-in L’auncil may, uhenever they deem necessary in the 
public interest, order the detention of any person subject 
to any conditions they may impose for any period of time not 
exceeding sixty days in respect of any one order. Any person 
released after such detention may again be detained as often 
as it may be deemed necessary in the public interest. No 
Court shall have pouer to enquire into or make any order in 
connection uith any such detention."
The Decree uas, therefore, in the nature of a preventive detention 
measure. Wide discretionary pouers of determining the public interest 
uere left to the Executive, to the exclusion of the Courts.
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While in Lesotho the Courts came to pronounce upon the legality
of detentions even though they were normally excluded from pronouncing
upon the detention law, in Swaziland this does not seem to have
occurred. It is difficult to explain the difference, except on the
basis of the difference in the nature of the two laws. But it should
also be remembered that in Lesotho for some years since 1974, it
was thought that nothing could be done about such detentions. Then
towards the end of the 1970's a breakthrough was made. It was
realised that the judiciary were independent enough to pronounce
upon the validity of detention orders. It may be that in Swaziland
there is a need for such a breakthrough. But again it should be
realised that in Lesotho the legal profession is not persecuted for
appearing in politically sensitive matters. In Swaziland it is
different. A defence lawyer was detained after vigorously defending
some South African refugees. He was held on a succession of detention 
216orders.
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In March 1978 a new detention law, the Detention Order 1978.
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came into force and superceded the Continuation of Period Order 1973
by virtue of which all detentions under Decree Mo. 2 were continued. The
new law provided for the detention of persons on the written order
of the Prime Minister. Such detentions for 60 days, may be renewed,
provided the Prime Minister informed the Council of Ministers about
his intention to do so and placed before them relevant information
including a report from the Commissioner of Prisons "on the condition
and behaviour" of the detainee. Before any detention order was made,
the Prime Minster was to inform the Council and place before them
relevant information, provided that he may, if it was in the public
interest, inform them after effecting the detention. "Mo order of
uetention made under subsection (1) shall be subject to any appeal to
219any court". The fact of detention was to be published in the 
Government uazette by the Attorney-General. Existing detention orders 
since 1973 were validated retrospectively. The Prime Minister was 
authorised to make regulations prescribing.
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- conditions under which detainees are to be held, 
the privileges to be accorded to any detainee,
- the procedure for making representations to the King 
or the Prime Minister in regard to the detention or 
conditions or privileges relating to it.
The regulations so made would be binding even if they are not published 
in the Gazette.
In this new law the Prime Minister was given the wide discretionary
power of determining when people should be detained. "Public interest"
was not defined, and it could be anything. The detention of Musa Shongwe,
who defended South Hfrican refugees, has already been mentioned. When
Dr. Zwane escaped from prison to Mozambique, three workers who were
on duty at the prison and one Longide Gamadze, a supporter of Dr. Zwane,
who lived near where the prisoner crossed the border, were held in
220detention without trial, instead of being charged with offences.
If they assisted a prisoner to escape, surely they had committed some 
offences? The point which is being made is that the meaning of public 
interest was sufficiently vague so as to enable the Prime Minister to 
punish people who may not be guilty of any offence.
The orders of detention are made by a sufficiently high official.
This may be some form of protection against irresponsible petty 
officials who could use the law to settle their private grudges.
The law provides for the publication of detentions in the Gazette.
In practice these publications are made only after the release of the 
221detainee. The purpose of publication was to permit public scrutiny 
of official actions. If no such publications are made during detention, 
no purpose was served, and the aim of the law was frustrated. Still, 
the provision far publication is better than none, because the working 
of the law could then be assessed for the purpose of critical comment.
In Lesotho detentions were secret, thus facilitating "disappearances".
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Those held under the Detention Order are usually citizens.
Foreigners, mostly refugees, are usually held in terms of the
imnigration laws. Just as in Botswana, refugees in Swaziland have
223been held in detention as "prohibited immigrants" and then
22Asometimes involuntarily returned to their country of origin.
The one strange instance uas that of Phiri, a citizen of Malawi,
uho in March 1973 uas charged uith remaining in Suaziland illegally
after being ordered to leave. He said he uas willing to go but had
no financial means nor a travel document to do so. He uas kept in
custody while officials debated his problem. Letters from one
official to another got lost. The matter came to the High Court
on review a year later in March 197A. That Court ordered the Chief
225Immigration Officer to arrange for the deportation of Phiri.
This uas a case of official incompetence leading to deprivation of 
liberty.
Pre-trial Detentions
The criminal procedure code of Suaziland makes provisions similar
to those of Lesotho uith regard to the bringing of susqected offenders
trial. It appears, however, that the police in Suaziland seem to
assume that they can hold a suspect or a possible witness for a long
time if the investigations call for this action. The case of .
226Barrt/jies v. A IMithianandan, which has been referred to above, 
illustrates this attitude which was rejected by the Court. Accused 
persons are also kept in police custody for long periods.
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A . Prohibition of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment
There is a consensus in the international community that torture 
should be prohibited, and that individuals should not be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. Governments deny 
that they engage in these practices. The denial is most emphatic in 
respect of torture. In practice people are subjected to torture and 
to cruel, degrading and inhuman practices. One problem which arises 
is that of definition. A State might justify its practices on the 
basis that they do not fall within the scope of the prohibition. The 
other problem is that of values. In an Africa which is conscious of
the colonial past, there is always a resistance against foreign values.
227This, as pointed out could degenerate into a mere platitude which 
serves to justify repression.
Definitions by international instruments, therefore, become
important. On December 9 1975 the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Torture and
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Other Cruel. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In 
it torture is defined as:
"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the 
instigation of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him 
or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to 
the extent consistent wiLn the Standards Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners". (Article 1(1)).
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The Declaration went on to describe torture as an aggravated and 
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(Article 1(2)). It forbade torture and the other punishment and 
treatment as offences to human dignity and a denial of the purposes 
of the United Nations Charter and as a violation of the fundamental 
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal declaration of Human Rights.
The African Charter on Human and People's Rights prohibits torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, but does not
229 23Qdefine them. In the Greek Case the European Commission on
Human Rights defined the meaning of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment, and it is quite clear that the definition
influenced the definition of torture in the Declaration by the UN
General Assembly.
The Constitution of Botswana, in line with the European Convention 
on Human Rights, provides as follows:
"No person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment"
(Section 7(1)) .
Having laid down the prohibition, the next provision (Section 7(2)) 
immediately explains that punishments which were lawful before 
independence shall not be held to be inconsistent with the prohibition. 
The Constitution does not define torture, and its meaning must be 
gathered from international instruments or from similar provisions in 
the legal systems of other countries.
In Lesotho and Swaziland, which have no written Constitutions, 
the Common Law and Statutes are the source from which we may gather 
information on rules concerning torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. As far as punishments which might be regarded as offending 
against the prohibition of torture (etc) are concerned, Botswana is 
no different from the other two States, since the Botswana Constitution 
preserved the status quo.
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A controvesial subject which arises as a result of African traditional 
cultures and modern ideas on human rights is that of the equality of 
the sexes. In the Constitution of Botswana, and in the repealed 
Constitutions of Lesotho and Swaziland, discrimination based on sex 
was not prohibited. Since the received Roman-Dutch law also 
discriminates on grounds of sex, women suffer from discrimination 
on the basis of the two legal systems which operate within the 
respective countries. In Botswana, most discriminatory laws can 
now be fought on the Dasis of the prohibition against inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment. This, however, is a subject 
which is best discussed under the topic of discrimination. In 
Lesotho and Swaziland there is no legai way of fighting discrimination 
except an the basis of statutory enactments.
(a! Torture
(i) Botswana
Torture has relatively not been a serious problem in Botswana. 
Allegations of torture have been maoe against the police, but they 
have not been proved. This, however, does not mean that torture aoes 
not take place. Police forces have a tendency to copy from each other. 
Most policemen in the former High Commission Territories are trained 
in Britain, where they learn torture techniques which were used 
during the colonial period, and are now used in places such as 
Northern Ireland. In the modern science of torture, the emphasis 
is on secrecy and the leaving of no traces of injury. If, however, 
former detainees complain of torture and describe the treatment 
which they suffered, and when such detainees are ordinary people 
who cannot be expected to have access to intimate details concerning 
the technology of torture, it is reasonable to conclude that they 
were indeed tortured.
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In State v. Sindaba and Others one of the accused had been 
taken out of prison where he was awaiting trial, and subjected to 
what was variously described as "intensive interrogation and" 
rengthy interrogation extending over several days". The issue was 
not the determination of the existence of torture, but the voluntariness 
of a "confession". But it is clear that the interrogation might 
possibly have amounted to torture, because one of the Courts' 
conclusion in rejecting the "confession" was:
"While it has not been proved that the police tortured
their prisoner, the State has not established that the
police did not apply physical and moral pressure to
induce the First accused to confess. It is certainly the
case that he was subjected to long interrogation while
232
under the power and control of the police".
233in State v. Bitsang Bagwasi and Others, the accused alleged that
he was assaulted by the police. Again the Court found the allegation
not proved. In that case Justice Dendy Young made remarks which
23Awould appear to encourage torture.
As long as the possiblity exists that accused persons are 
subjected to ill-treatment in the hands of the police, the 
suspicion will always remain that torture exists in Botswana.
(ii) Lesotho
Amongst the three countries under discussion here, Lesotho has 
been perhaps the most outstanding for practising torture. The 
criminal law and the law of delict (torts) in Lesotho forbids the 
application of unlawful force to the human being. Torture, if 
proved, would be unlawful. Yet substantiated cases of torture
231
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have occurred in Lesotho.Immediately following the political turmoil
in 1970 and again following the attempted coup in 197A,
235serious cases of police brutality occurred.
After 1970 the B.N.P. Youth League, the Young Pioneers, trained
in Malawi, were set loose an the opposition party supporters. They were
followed by the Police Mobile Unit. The home of a Minister of
Government became a "torture centre". Horrible things happened there,
and one can do no more tnan quote from the record of 0.M. Khaketla.
He reports that when one woman, a mother, denied any knowledge of the
existence of weapons, "She was beaten up, kicked and told that __
she would be shot and her baby thrown over the precipice". She
broke down and implicated her uncle, a minister of the Apostolic
Faith, whose "long hair was pulled out by the roots, as also was
his beard", all this in the presence of a Minister of Government,
his mother and wife. A man was made to strip naked in front of his
daughter for her to see where she came from. When he protested
"he was ordered to have sexual intercourse with his daughter; but
he told them that was the limit and requested them to shoot him
outright. -The daughter was then raped by one of the Youths in the
presence of her father. ... When Nqamakele was finally released he
was both mentally and physically affected; his body was a mess of
wounds, as he had oeen pricked with a sharp instrument". 'Masechele
Khaketla sent a letter of complaint to the Government listing
terrible atrocities in it. The Prime Minister replied that he had
no idea that these things were happening, and promised to take immediate
action. The "torture centre" was dismantled soon thereafter, and we
are told that there was a slight improvement in the treatment of
detainees. But there was no stopping the Youth League. Together
with the then Police Mobile Unit they went on a rampage in the rural 
236areas.
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These things happened during a state of emergency. The events 
of 197+ were no different, except that no state of emergency was 
declared.
After 1973 although Lesotho was officially not under a state of 
237emergency it was ruled like one. Detentions without trial were
common. Although information concerning detainees was hard to come
by, it was nonetheless not difficult to conclude that detainees were
tortured. One detainee, on hearing of his impending re-arrest, coimitted
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suicide, saying he was not prepared to face another detention.
Another detainee was made to read what purported to be his "confession"
over Radio Lesotho, in which "confession" he denounced his connection
with the Lesotho Liberation Army and Ntsu Mokhehle. The essence of
239
the "confession" was a denunciation of his political beliefs.
The "disappearance" of Jobo Khalane and the "suicide" of Sophie Makhele 
2LQhave been mentioned. The late Litsietsi Putsaa told an Amnesty
International Mission to Lesotho that he was tortured while in detention.
One speaker at his funeral publicly related what Putsoa had told him
about his experiences in detention. An Amnesty International Mission
in December 1901 was allowed access to A 5 known detainees. They all
said they were tortured, and said this in the presence of a Magistrate
and a senior police officer. They said they had been assaulted, denied
knowledge about their whereabouts, held in solitary confinement and
blind-folded whenever they were movea. The Mission reported that the
detainees could not have concocted the story because, according to the
2A2
authorities, they were kept separately.
In the absence of a contrary inquest finding, Setipa Mathaba must
have died in the process of torture. This appiies to Sophie Makhele
, i 2L5 as well.
2A1
Torture is not confined to security matters. It is an open 
secret in Lesotho that people are sometimes tortured i.n the process
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of investigating ordinary crime. The situation has been accepted
amongst ordinary people and has often been silently aknowledged in
higher circles. Courts of law know about it and they have commented
on it, but have done nothing about it. Prosecution authorities come across
instances of torture all the time, but prosecutions are hardly ever
instituted against those responsible. The police sometimes seem to
be a law unto themselves when it comes to the practice of torture,
and they laugh at and ignore statements of disapproval by the Courts.
A few court cases will illustrate the phenomenon.
In 1975 a boy from the mountains of Lesotho was brought to a
Magistrate, charged with rape. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced.
He, however, appeared ill. It was then discovered that he had wounds
all over his body from a whip. He was photographed and the pictures
kept in the file. IMo further action was taken even though he said
2AAhe had been assaulted by the police. The case should at least have 
been sent on review to the High Court so that an inquiry into his plea 
of guilt could be tested. He was brought to Court by the very policemen 
who was alleged to have committed the assault. So it was quite possible 
that he had been instructed to plead guilty or pay with more assaults.
2A5In the case of Rex v. Mphulanyane and Others a one-legged man 
vanished without trace. His younger brother and two other villagers 
were charged with his murder by drowning in a flooded river. All 
accused persons described how they were tortured while in police custody. 
The wife of the brother described how one morning long after the 
arrest of her husband she was forced td listen to the "confession" of 
her husband who was kneeling in front of her in a dejected manner.
The allegations of the accused were believed and the alleged confession 
was rejected, yet no action was ever taken against the responsible 
policemen, and the police know that no action will be taken.
Perhaps the worst case of torture ever to be related to a Court
2A6is that of Rex, v. Molupe and Another. One accused, the victim
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□f the torture, was kept in police custody for 5 weeks without
being taken to Court. During that time he underwent the most
horrifying experience which was believed by the Court. His 
experiences were summarised by the Court thus:
(1) he spent a week at the charge office without being 
asked a single question.
(2) W/0 Moletsane asked him if he knew about the death 
of the deceased and he denied any knowledge. That 
same evening he was handcuffed, undressed and made
to undergo a horrible treatment referred to as Apollo. 
During this process, which he says was painful, he
denied any knowledge of the murder under investigation.
(3) The following morning Sekoane called him and told him
that he was being taken before a representative of the
King. He says that he later came to the person who
posed as the representative of the King. He was one
2A7
Tlokotsi - a member of "Lebotho la Khotso".
However, when he appeared before Tlokotsi, he told 
him that the police were assaulting him saying that he 
should say that he knew about the death of the deceased. 
Tlokotsi did not do anything but merely said he would 
"speak to the police". Later that evening Ld/Q Moletsane, 
in the presence of the other policemen (mentioned earlier 
in this judgement) asked him why he had told the 
representative of the King "shit". Apollo treatment was 
again accorded him. They told him what they knew about 
the case and told him that is what he had to tell. While 
he was being accorded this infamous treatment, Moletsane 
extracted his front upper tooth with a pair of pliers. 
Insults were hurled at him when blood from his mouth 
dropped on the floor. He was partially released to 
clean it and while- doing so Sekoane hit him on the right
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cheek with a fiat that caused one of his molar
teeth to break. Thereafter they asked him if he had
heard what they had said and he answered in the affirmativ/e.
He was told that he would be taken before an Assistant 
District Commissioner where he would have to agree that 
he killed the deceased.
(i*) The following day, he was, instead taken to Sani Pass
in order for the swelling an his body to subside.
(5) On his return from Sani Pass he was asked if he still
recalled what he had been told. He agreed. He was then
handcuffed and asked to repeat that he had been told.
He did and they appeared satisfied.
(6) The following day he was taken to the Assistant Commissioner.
He told this gentleman that he knew nothing about the death 
of the deceased. He informed him about the assaults on
him by the police. He later came to know this gentleman
as being one of the police officers at Mokhotlong charge-office.
2A8(7) Later that evening he was accorded the Apollo treatment 
because he had not said what he had been told. He said
he had made a mistake. In addition to the usual Apollo 
treatment, his testicles were pressed by a pair of pliers.
He screamed with pain. They then repeated to him what 
they had said to him on earlier occasions and he agreed 
he had done all those things i.e. how he and his co-accused 
had killed the deceased. It was said that the following 
day he would be taken to a magistrate to whom he was to 
repeat what they had told him.
(8) The fallowing morning, instead of going to the magistrate, 
he was again taken to Sani Pass in order that the swelling
on his body should subside.
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(9) On his return from Sani Pass he was made to repeat what
they had said to him. They said that if he spoke "shit"
before the magistrate they would kill him. He was lacked 
in a cell for three days without food.
(10) He was then taken before the magistrate but first he was
reminded as to what he should say to the magistrate.
(11) He was also reminded that if he did not tell all, the 
magistrate would inform them. He was told that the 
magistrate would ask him questions and he should not 
deny anything. He agreed. UJ/0 Moletsane said he would 
kill him if he did not do as they told him.
(12) Sekoane took him to the magistrate where he repeated and 
answered questions as instructed.
Both the accused were acquitted. There was not even a suggestion that 
the alleged treatment of the accused should be investigated and those 
responsible brought to trial. The Crown Counsel himself could have 
reported the matter to the Solicitor-General for possible action, 
but he did not, nothing was done about the matter.
Sometimes the Courts seem to encourage the ill-treatment of 
detainees. In this same case of Rex v. Molupe and Others there was 
cited with approval the Botswana case of The State v. Bitsanq Bogwasi 
and Others in which Mr. Justice Dendy Young is reported as having 
said:
"Now I wish to make it clear for the guidance of the police 
and all concerned that, in my judgement, even prolonged 
interrogation including all the techniques and tricks of 
the trade directed to obtaining a confession from an accused 
who is prepared to talk - even if the interrogation proceeds 
to the point of possibly disturbing the normal function of the 
mind - may be justified in the interests of the investigation
of the crime".
'<♦9
- 76
The learned justice is reported as having gone on to say that a 
statement obtained in that manner would not be admissible, although 
it might be useful for purposes of the investigation.
The priority of interests as expressed by Mr. Justice Dendy Young is 
a dangerous one and expresses approval of torture so long as the 
Court will not be asked to accept evidence extracted through that 
process. The statement, coming as it does from a high official of 
government, supports the view that in Botswana and apparently in 
Lesotho, torture is approved for certain purposes. Add to this the 
fact that in Lesotho no disciplinary or criminal charges are ever 
brought against torturers, that view appears to be well founded.
The Internal Security (General) Act of 19B2 provides that a
hospital shall be regarded as a detention centre if a detainee is being 
250kept there. This seems to be an early attempt at involving the 
medical profession in the process of torture. In 1977 the Amnesty
International Danish Medical Group reported that "a minority of doctors
251are involved in the practice of torture". The role of the notorious
Dr. Dimitrios Kofas, (dubbed "the orange juice doctor" by detainees)
252during Army rule in Greece, is well known.
In Lesotho there are no Army or Police medical doctors. The 
ordinary medical practitioner in the government service could, therefore, 
find himself being "used" to assist in the process of torture, if he 
were not careful. The decision to collaborate, of course, rests with 
the individual doctor.
Government lawyers in Lesotho were also known to be under the
pressure of the police to defend unlawful killings and acts of
torture by the State. Sometimes ridiculous arguments have been
253presented in Court in the defence of illegal detentions. The 
failure of the inquest law was to a large part due to the inaction 
of the Crown lawyers who appear to be under the instructions of the
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police as to whether an inquest should be held or not. The
increased power of the police showed itself during the trial of
Lieutanant Colonel Phaloane for the murder of Bassie Mahase. There
were attempts to obstruct the inquest proceedings. Investigations of
the offence were superficial. After the conviction and the loss of
a subsequent appeal by the Colonel, the Crown Counsel who prosecuted
25Awas declared persona non grata in Lesotho, the contract of Justice
Rooney, who convicted, was not renewed; the Solicitor-General, who
authorised the prosecution, resigned, and the Colonel was released
255from prison on parole after serving a minimum of his sentence.
He obtained all his employment benefits contrary to Public Service 
Regulations.
By these tactics the Government attempted to intimidate the legal 
profession into collaborating with its system of administration.
(iii) Swaziland
On the surface Swaziland does not appear to be guilty Qf torture,
but its police force has not been above suspicion. The cases of 
256Rex v. Zwane and Others*- involved allegations of assault in police
custody. In both cases it was not proved that the assaults had indeed
taken place, although in the second case the issue of the assault was left
undecided because the accused declared that what he had told the
police as a result of the assault was the truth. For this reason
his statement was held admissible in his trial. The admission of
that statement was, of course, not legally correct, it was submitted.
The rule against self-discrimination would not allow this, and this
is the point which Mr. Justice Young was at pains to explain in
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The State v. Bitsana Baqwasi and Others. Our concern here is that 
the attitude of the Court in admitting a true statement as evidence 
regardless of how it was obtained, encourages the police to use torture 
to extract confessions and statements. Such an attitude by the Courts
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amounts to official approval of torture and ill-treatment of 
suspects.
It should de noted that torture consists of the infliction of
severe pain which is physical or mental. The case of Baartjies v .
259Nlthlanandan, in which a prospective witness was kept in police
custody for 9 months, might well be a case of torture, if not of 
inhuman or degrading treatment.
(b) Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment
(i) Botswana
Botswana did not outlaw punishments which were lawful before 
independence. Punishments which may be imposed in terms of the law 
are death, imprisonment, whipping and fines. The death sentence
may not be imposed on persons who are 18 years old or under, nor on
a pregnant woman. Corporal punishment may not be imposed on females 
nor on males who are aged 40 or above. Imprisonment may not be 
imposed on persons who are aged 14 or below.
In Europe corporal punishment is considered a cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment. This is not so in Africa. The Courts in 
Botswana are, however, enjoined not to subject any person to torture, 
or to inhuman or degrading punishment. This presumably means that 
corporal punishment must be carried out according to specific rules.
In the Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions there exist the sentence
261of being declared a habitual criminal. This means that the convict 
is kept in prison indefinitely, yet it is not life imprisonment. 
Botswana does not seem to have this farm of punishment.
It appears that in Botswana complaints of ill-treatment in the
262
hands of officials are investigated by the Attorney-General. In
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this way it appears that the state is not party to processes of 
torture and ill-treatment, regardless of whether such complaints are 
actually substantiated.
(ii) Lesotho and Swaziland
Criminal sentences which may be imposed by the Courts in Lesotho
263and Swaziland are generally similar to each other and basically the
same as those for Botswana. The death sentence may not be imposed on
persons who are 18 years old or under at the time of the commission
of the offence, nor may the sentence be imposed on or executed against
a pregnant woman, who may only be sentenced to imprisonment. Corporal
punishment may not be imposed on females. There is, however, no age
limit in the imposition of this punishment on males, thus differing
from Botswana. Persons under 21 years in Lesotho and under 18 in
Swaziland may only be sentenced to "moderate correction" with a light
cane, and the number of strokes is limited to 15. Imprisonment may
be with or without solitary confinment and spare diet where it is specifically
so provided by any particular law in respect of the offence charged.
Young persons may be sentenced to a juvenile training centre. Where
a person is declared a habitual criminal in Lesotho, he shall not
be released on probation unless he has served at least 9 years of that
2E/+ 265
sentence. -In Swaziland he is detained at His Majesty's pleasure.
□n the whole the policy of the Courts is to impose corporal punishment 
on young persons, the reason being to avoid their imprisonment where 
they might be influenced by hardened criminals. There are no cases 
of imprisonment with solitary confinement or spare diet in Lesotho.
It has already been stated that in Lesotho the Government does not 
investigate complaints of the ill-treatment of detainees. There is no 
indication that Swaziland is any different.
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It has already been stated that in Lesotho the Government does 
not investigate complaints of the ill-treatment of detainees. There 
is no indication that Swaziland is any different.
In Lesotho it appears that the crises over many years brought 
about by the political problems in the country resulted in an attitude 
of disregard for the inviolability of the human being. Matters of 
State security and of law and order are given undue priority over human 
rights. In the preservation of law and order, public officials acted 
with reckless over-zeal that often led to death and serious injury.
In some cases the culprits were brought to trial and punished. In others, 
no trials follow.
266In the case of Rex v. Ralinaleli Kalanyane the accussed admitted 
his guilt to treason, was sentenced to 7 years, six of which were sus­
pended for a period of certain conditions. The reasons for the light 
sentence included the fact that on his arrest he was severely beaten up 
by "villagers" who crippled him. His property was destroyed. He was 
lucky to have survived the assaults. The Court deplored the assumption 
by the "villagers" of its functions, but nothing more was done against 
them.
Early in November 1982 students at Christ The King High School, 
Roma, went on a rampage causing damage to school property amounting to 
several thousand Maloti. The head teacher is said to have been nearly 
killed. The Police Mobile Unit (later Lesotho Paramilitary Force) was 
called in. The riot was suppressed by means which went beyond what was 
necessary. The boys were indiscriminately chased about, brutally 
assaulted. Some of them had to go to hospital, while others were being 
cared for in their homes. Days after the disturbances the students were 
still being made to undergo strenuous exercises and being deprived of 
sleep. Some of them were mere boys who, when they comolained of exhaustion, 
were brutally urged on since they did not get tired when they attempted to 
kill a head teacher. The conservative Catholic newspaper, Moeletsi oa
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Basotho, reporting this event, condemned the students' action, but 
went on to deplore the manner in which the police suppressed the riot:
"Even though ue applaud their (the police) action, on the 
other hand ue must point out a mistake, if uhat is reported 
is true. At Christ The King, after the suppression of the 
riot, it is reported that those whom ue correctly regard as 
the protectors of the people took the lau into their hands.
They lashed, kicked and used fists. A paper uhich is
.jealous of individual rights cannot kpep quiet. Every
person is not guilty until proved by interpreters of the lau".^:i/
In Rex v. Ramabitsa Motanyane and Others the accused uere brought
to trial. The facts uere that a chief ordered the six accused to arrest 
a man uho had assaulted his oun sister-in-law. They severely assaulted 
the prisoner and were seen leading him away. The following day the
prisoner was found dead in a ravine. The accused were convicted of
culpable homicide and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 
four to seven years. In passing sentence Mr. Justice Cotran remarked:
"This is yet another case where a life has been lost quite
unnecessarily. A very minor assault by the deceased on
his sister-in-law ended up in his death at the hands of
those responsible for law and order in the village. The
first accused and the third accused were both men in
authority. They are perhaps more blameworthy than the
268others 1.
In Swaziland it was reported that a South African touring family was
stopped by the Army who molested the mother in front of her children.
The government denied these allegations. The Army on the other hand
claimed to have apprehended five vnuths far stealing army uniforms and
posing in them as soldiers. The youths were then publicly paraded in. 269
two towns until the Attorney-General stopped tne spectacle. The
Attorney-General1s action may be an indication of government's policy 
not to be involved in inhuman or degrading treatment.
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The Independence Cosntitutions of the three forrrer British High 
Commission territories each included a chapter on citizenship. Except 
far a small change, the provisions for citizenship remain the same in
Botswana. The present citizenship law in Swaziland is contained in the
270Citizenship Order of 197A which repealed section A of the Citizenship
271Act of 1967. In Lesotho citizenship is provided for in the Lesotho
272Citizenship Order 1971 which repealed the Citizenship Act of 1967.
Matters of irrmigration and deportation in Botswana are dealt with under
the Immigration (Consolidation) Act of 1966. In Lesotho such matters
275are dealt with in terms of the Aliens Control Act 1966, while in
276Swaziland the governing law is the Immigration Act of 196A.
In Botswana and Lesotho there are virtually no problems with regard 
to matters of citizenship. It is in Swaziland since the 1970's that 
major problems have arisen concerning statelessness. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the citizenship laws of all three countries are all 
outstanding for their discrimination against women in matters of citizen­
ship. The consequence of that discrimination is, ironically, that men 
suffer as well even though the discrimination is the product of male- 
dominated societies. It is this question of discrimination to which we 
must now direct our attention. A discussion of Swaziland and stateless­
ness will fallow thereafter.
Citizenship and Discrimination
In the laws of the three countries there is a provision that a 
woman who marries a citizen shall be entitled on application to be 
registered as a citizen. This is partly an advantage to womenfolk. But 
it also has a great disadvantage in that a woman citizen who marries a 
non-citizen cannot confer her citizenship on her husband. The provisions 
as they are make sense according to African ideas of jurisprudence.
The indigenous customary laws of the three countries provide that people
5. Citizenship
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belong to families, and that family membership is acquired either 
through birth or marriage. Being patrilineal societies, the wife 
becomes a member of the husband's family on marriage. It therefore 
makes sense that the husband should confer citizenship on his wife.
There is no indication, however, that account was taken of African 
ideas of family organization in the drafting of the citizenship pro­
visions in the basic laws governing the subject. The language used 
expresses the values of individualist societies. Similar discriminatory 
provisions are found in European societies.
One other common discriminatory provisions is that concerning 
citizenship by birth. Generally it is provided that a person who is 
born outside the relevant country to a father who is a citizen shall 
become a citizen. A citizen mother, therefore, is not able to confer 
citizenship on her child except where the birth takes place within the 
country. The repealed Swaziland constitution of 1968 had an admirable 
provision concerning illegitimate births, which read:
"Any reference ... to the father of a person shall, in
relation to any person born out of wedlock, be construed
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as a reference to the mother of that person".
This meant that "father" sometimes meant "mother". The new legislation 
of Swaziland does not include this provision. The law of Lesotho has a 
similar provision which is strangely worded:
"A reference in this Order to the birth of a person is
construed as including both legitimate and illegitimate
birth, and the expressions 'father' and 'parent' are
<^ 73construed accordingly " • '
It does not appear that Botswana makes any provision for illegitimate 
births.
The Constitution of Botswana prohibits discrimination, but the 
position of sex discrimination is not clear. Article 3 reads as follows:
-  8A
"Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the 
right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, 
colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and for the public interest to each and all 
of the following namely -
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the 
protection of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly 
and association; and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other 
property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation,
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose 
of affording protection to those rights and freedoms subject to 
such limitations of that protection as are contained in those 
provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the 
enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by an individual does 
not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public 
interest.
According to this Article, discrimination based on sex is prohibited. 
Article 15, on the other hand, reads as follows:
"15 (1) ... no law shall make any provision that is discri­
minatory either of itself or in its effect".
" ( 2 )  "
"(3) In this section, the expression 'discriminatory' means 
affording different treatment to different persons attributable 
wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, 
tribe, pxace of origin, political opinions, colour or creed 
whereby persons of one such descriptions are subjected to dis­
abilities or restrictions to which persons of another such
8s _
description are not made subject or are accorded privileges 
or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another 
such description-"
There is no mention of the category "sex". So, Article 15 does not 
prohibit sex discrimination. Both Article 3 and 15 appear in the same 
Chapter 2 entitled "Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 
the Individual" in the Constitution. It would appear that there is a 
contradiction here. However, the point is that, although citizenship 
is a fundamental right, it is not included within the list of rights 
and freedoms in Chapter 2. The prohibition of discrimination does not, 
therefore, apply to citizenship matters, and hence the discrimination 
against women is not forbidden.
Citizenship in Swaziland
It has already been stated that the recovery of independence for 
Swaziland meant the recovery of the African heritage of Swaziland as 
expressed in the Swazi culture. According to indigenous Swazi law and 
customs a citizen is a person who has "khontad". This means that a 
person has been accepted as a Swazi in Swaziland. The procedure for 
"khonta" seems to be that an alien drives a number of beasts, about 
3 head of cattle, tD Lobamba, the administrative seat of the King 
(IMkwenyama). He reports himself on arrival and states his mission; he 
then waits, - he could wait for days - for the King to "see" him.
After the period of waiting he is told that his request has been 
accepted and he is now a Swazi. The beasts are left at Lobamba,
The procedure of "khonta" is not in practice confined to the 
King. He performs this function through chiefs throughout the country. 
The person who is accepted as a Swazi is a subject of the chief who 
accepted his beasts.
When, during the independence negotiations, a provision appeared 
in the proposed Constitution that a person could be a Swazi citizen by
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his mere birth in Suaziland or by his mere birth to a citizen of
Suaziland uho had not "khontad", this uas unacceptable to traditional
Suazis. It meant that you could have citizens uho uere not subject
to a chief. In the colonial era this uas passible and many people,
especially the descendants of European settlers had not "khontad", and
here they uere occupying arable land, uhile the "true" Suazi settled
on non-arable land. Through the process of defining uho citizens uere,
it uas possible to enhance the pouer of the government aver the alien
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element uhich so dominated the economic affairs of Suaziland.
The pre-independence Constitution provided for a compromise on 
citizenship. While its provisions had no international significance 
until after independence, it afforded those uho desired to identify 
themselves uith Suaziland an opportunity to become citizens. This 
Constitution, therefore, provided that the follouing category of persons 
uould became citizens by operation of lau:
a person born rn Suaziland before, on or after the pres­
cribed date (i.e. the day on uhich self-government uas 
attained);
a person born outside Suaziland before the prescribed date 
uho, immediately before that date, is a citizen of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person 
and uhose father uas born in Suaziland;
a person born outside Suaziland and uhose father is a
200
citizen of Suaziland by virtue of other provisions.
These provisions meant that many people uho had never "khontad" uere 
made citizens. The mere fact of birth uithin Suaziland also conferred 
the status of citizenship.
The Suaziland proposals during the negotiations far independence 
uere as follous:
_  a7 .
- the citizenship status of persons who acquired citizenship 
up to independence would de preserved;
- birth within Swaziland would not by itself be sufficient 
to confer citizenship. In addition the father should be 
a citizen;
- in the case of a birth which takes place outside Swaziland, 
it would not be sufficient that the father is a citizen of
201Swaziland. He would have to be also domiciled in Swaziland.
All three proposals were accepted and were included in the independence 
Constitution as Articles 20, 21 and 22. The matter stood there until 
1973 when the 1968 Constitution was jettisoned mainly because of the 
citizenship issue.
In the first post-independence elections held in Swaziland in
1972, the Mgwane National Liberatory Congress won a single constituency,
202thus succeeding in returning three candidates to Parliament. One of 
the three was Bhekindlela Thomas Nowenya. He had been resident in 
Swaziland for some fifteen or more years prior to 1972. He had a farm 
and he was a politician who had been registered as a voter on several 
occasions and stood for elections in 1972. This meant that if he 
was born in Swaziland he was a citizen by operation of law. On May 25, 
1972 Ngwenya was attending the King's meeting at Lobamoa when he was 
arrested and served with a deportation order on the ground of being an 
alien in terms of the Immigration Act of 196A, and deported to South 
Africa. He managed to return to Swaziland and he petitioned the Hign 
Court for two orders, namely:
- an order setting aside his deportation order,
- a declaration order that he was a citizen.
His basic contention was that he was born in Swaziland and, therefore,
he was a citizen by virtue of the law as it stood then. A judgement of
203
the full Court (Sir Philip Pike C.J. and Johnson A.J.) found for him.
- s a ­
lt was proved that he was born at a place called Ntsalitshe in Swaziland. 
The main evidence against Ngwenya was that of a man called
Stropo Ngwenya who informed the government that the petitioner was not 
a citizen, but who declined to give evidence viva voce when called upon 
to do so by the Court. He was of the same age as Ngwenya and could only 
relate what he was told about the birth of the petitioner.
The government appealed and at the same time issued a new summons
against Ngwenya on the ground that false evidence had been used in
support of his case. At the same time Parliament amended the Immigration
Act of 196A by introducing a provision that, where there was a doubt
about whether a person belonged to Swaziland, a special tribunal should
2BAdetermine that issue to the exclusion of the Courts. Meantime Sir 
Philip Pike's term of judicial office came to an end but his contract 
of employment was not renewed. Mr. Justice Hill took his position as
Chief Justice. Charles Nathan, a South African, was appointed puisne
< - 285judge.
Immediately the new amendment to the Immigration Act was promulgated, 
Ngwenya petitioned the High Court for orders that:
the amending law was inconsistent with the Constitution 
and therefore invalid,
- alternatively, that the amendment did not apply to him.
286The Court (Hill, C.J.) found against Ngwenya. He appealed to the
287Court of Appeal. That Court found for him. The reasons were that 
the Constitution protected various rights of Swazi citizens; the Courts 
were expresely or impliedly empowered to decide on whether such rights 
had been infringed. In order to decide such issues the Court must first 
decide whether the person affected is a citizen. The rules about who 
citizens are appear in the Constitution. To exclude the Courts from 
deciding on questions of citizenship would amount to an amendment of the 
Constitution by a simple procedure of Parliament, whereas the Constitution 
can only be altered by a joint sitting of both Houses of parliament.
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The Court went on to point out that, even if the new amendment could
be said to be confined to matters of immigration only, a conflict
between the Courts and the new tribunal would arise because the Court
might decide that a person was a "citizen" for purposes of the electoral
process, while the tribunal might decide that he was not a citizen for
purposes of immigration. "It is inconceivable that in enacting the
amending Act Parliament intended to leave this obvious source of conflict
288unresolved", said Justice Schreiner. For these reasons the amending 
law was declared beyond the powers of Parliament to enact by simple 
procedure.
This uas on March 29, 1973. The Executive branch of government 
had been restrained by the Judiciary. The former were suddenly awakened
rudely into a full appreciation of the meaning of limited government,
and they did not like it. On April 12, the Constitution uas abrogated.
The inconvenient Constitution naving been moved out of the way, 
the King-in-Council enacted the Citizenship Order of 197A uhose applica­
tion was made retrospective to April 12, 1973. Section 3 of the new 
law provided that:
"Any person uho on the 12th of April, 1973 uas legally a 
citizen of Suaziland shall, subject to section 7, be a 
citizen of Suaziland;
Provided that a person born in Suaziland before the 
12th of April, 1973 shall not be a citizen of Suaziland 
if at the time of such person's birth his father uas
not a citizen of Suaziland, unless on application made
by such person to the Minister he is registered as a 
citizen under section 6(1) (b):
And provided further that a person born outside Suaziland 
before the 12th of April, 1973, and uhose father 
is or uas a citizen of Suaziland but uas not at the 
time of the birth of such person domiciled in Suaziland, 
shall not be registered as a citizen under section 6(1) (b).
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The effect of the first proviso is that persons who were 
citizens before April 1973 and prior to 1960 (Independence) could 
find themselves being aliens, something which the leaders of Swaziland 
failed to achieve during the independence negotiations. Such "aliens"
can apply to be registered as citizens in terms of section 6(1) (b).
The second proviso also extended its application to the position prior 
to 1960, thus going contrary to the agreement contained in the inde­
pendence Constitution. Persons who found themselves "aliens" by reason 
of this proviso could also apply to be registered in terms of section 
6(1) (b).
Section 6(1) (b) provided that:
"subject to this section, any of the following persons
may make written application to the Minister registered
as a citizen of Swaziland -
(a)
(b) any person one of whose parents is or was at the 
death of such parent a citizen of Swaziland;
(c) any person whom the Minister considers as worthy 
of being registered as a citizen of Swaziland".
Having caused a lot of damage by depriving persons of long-standing in 
Swaziland of their citizenship, an attempt was then made to repair some 
of that damage. If a person's mother was a citizen, say, in 19A0 while 
his father was not, such a person could apply for registration as a 
citizen as long as he was born in Swaziland prior to April 1973. That 
seems to have been the meaning of the first proviso. The second proviso 
seems to mean that a person born outside Swaziland prior to April 1973 
and whose father was a citizen but was not domiciled in Swaziland may 
apply for registration.
UJe are referring here to people who were most probably citizens 
prior to April 1973. When they apply they may well be registered as 
citizens except that the Minister has complete discretion in the matter.
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In terms of section 6(1) (c) any person who is worthy may apply for
citizenship and he may well have his application granted because the
Minister has a discretion in the matter. It would have been judicious 
to have a system of priority as to who have a first right to citizen- 
ship. The complete discretion by the Minister could be a temptation 
to corruption.
The categories of persons who fall under the two provisos to 
section 3 are subjected to the process of registration if they desired 
to be citizens. Nationality by registration is of lesser value 
because of the risk of deprivation of citizenship. The Minister may 
deprive any citizen by registration of that citizenship if he is, 
inter alia, sentenced to imprisonment for at least twelve months in
any country within 12 years of being registered, or he has at any time 
been convicted within Swaziland of an offence involving sedition or 
subversion since his acquisition of the citizenship of Swaziland. One 
other ground for deprivation is if:
"such person could but for the fact of his citizenship
of'Swaziland be deemed to be a Prohibited Immigrant
under the provisions of the Immigration Act No. 32 of 
1964".289
Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1964 makes a list of persons who are 
prohibited from entering Swaziland. The list includes criminals of all 
kinds including traffickers in drugs, prostitutes and pimps, arms 
dealers and so on. There is a category of prohibited immigrant, namely,
"a person who, in consequence of information received from a source 
considered reliable by the Minister is deemed by the Minister to be an 
undesirable Inhabitant of, or visitor to, Swaziland". The word inhabitant 
is not defined anywhere. It appears that if a registered citizen is 
guilty of any of these matters listed in the Immigration Act he could be 
deprived of his citizenship.
The Citizenship Order is outstanding for the amount of discretion 
it gives to the government. Apart from the discretion, there are no
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meaningful safeguards against the abuse of power. It should be recalled 
that for his decision on the deportation of Ngwenya, the Minister relied 
on hearsay evidence of a witness who was not willing to testify in 
Court. This is an example of the way unrestricted power may be exercised 
In the 1968 Constitution it was provided that the mother of an illegiti­
mate child would be regarded as its "father". This provision has not
been enacted. In Lesotho it is provided that an abandoned baby shall be
29Cregarded as born in Lesotho and therefore a citizen. It is moreover
provided that a person born in Lesotho does not automatically become a
291citizen unless he would be rendered stateless. There are no similar 
provisions in Swaziland.
6. Refugees and their Treatment
An account of a conference on refugees in 1979 begins thus:
"Africa has the world's largest refugee problem. At the 
same time, African countries have been mast generous
in trying, within their limited resources, to provide
292•hosoitnlity for African refugees".
Two main causes may be identifiable for the refugee problem in Africa.
The first is the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The second
cause is the gross violation of human rights by some African States,
293thus burdening neighbours with the task of receiving refugees.
There being so many millions of refugees in Africa the question of 
asylum becomes important. Each State has the sole discretion to grant 
asylum according to international laws; there is no right on the part 
of an alien to demand asylum. Yet many States in Africa do make 
provision in their legislation for the exercise of the right to asylum 
by refugees. It is this legislation that we shall examine in respect 
of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
The grant of asylum implies the principles of non-refoulment. In 
order to ensure the security of refugees this principle must be scru­
pulously observed. LJe shall have occasion in this part to see if the
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record of the three States in their observance of this principle was 
incorporated into municipal legislation on refugees.
Some countries treat refugees as mere immigrants and as such 
they could be returned to their country of origin. The legislation 
of Swaziland is along these lines.
The refugees problem has an economic dimension. If a country offers 
asylum, it can expect some financial assistance from other countries on 
the basis of the principle of sharing the burden of refugees, or from 
international organizations. Greater benefit could be obtained by 
inflating the number of refugees granted asylum. In this way it becomes 
difficult for researchers to know the true state of affairs.
At six months' intervals the Refugee Advisory Committee reviews 
the case of refugees to discover if they still satisfy the requirements 
for refugee status and to discover their moral and economic needs.
If the requirements for refugee status are no longer satisfied, the 
status of refugee may be lost and such refugees become ordinary 
aliens subject to the immigration laws, including liability to be 
removed from Botswana.
Section 9 of the Act provides that a refugees may at any time
be removed from Botswana to any country other than a country where
he might be persecuted. An amendment of 1967, however, qualified
this rule by providing that on grounds of national security or public
order or where the refugee has been convicted of a serious crime
"which in the opinion of the Minister indicates that the recognised
refugee constitutes a danger to the community", the refugee may be
299removed to any country whatsoever. In January 1981 four South 
African refugees were summarily removed to South Africa after 
being "de-recognised". They had refused to go to the refugee camp 
at Dukwe. According to reports, the Minister used their removal
_  %
as an example to those who would misbehave. It does appear that
these four refugees were validly "de-recognised". On arrival in
300South Africa they were immediately detained. A valid 
"de-recognition" should have been after a review of their case 
by the Committee.
Botswana is bound by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention of 
1951 which reads as follows:
"1. IMo contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, memoership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country 
in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country"-
On the basis of this Article, Botswana could expel refugees to their 
countries of origin, but the decision has to be according to a
301process of law in terms of article 32 which is not binding an Botswana.
After the expulsion of the four refugees, Botswana reaffirmed its
302commitment to give asylum to refugees.
Botswana has not undertaken to provide employment to refugees 
nor to allow them free movement or freedom to choose their residence.
This country has not undertaken to facilitate the naturalization of 
refugees. Although Botswana has not undertaken not to prosecute 
refugees who enter the country illegally, such prosecutions are not 
brought against such illegal entrants.
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Some refugees are members of the liberation movements in 
Southern Africa. One of the objectives of the Organization of 
African Unity is to liberate Africa, and member nations have undertaken 
to co-operate with the Organization in the achievement of this objective. 
Such fighters should therefore be granted facilities in the pursuit 
of the liberation struggle. Botswana does not allow its territory to 
be used as a staging post for attacks into neighbouring states.
The policy of the government is to protect refugees. When a
refugee was abducted, the Court which tried the abductors recommended
the raising of the penalties for this type of abduction to impress
303
upon the minds of those criminals that this was a serious crime.
(ii) Lesotho
Amongst the three States discussed here, Lesotho had least
restrictions on refugees. Apart from the expulsions of refugees in
the 1960's for allegedly engaging in local politics, there had been
30A
no wholesale forceful removal of refugees from this country.
It is somewhat ironic that a country whose nationals are refugees 
elsewhere as a result of repressive policies, should be the least 
stringent in its refugee policies. It should be mentioned further 
that in Lesotho the legislative measures for the control of aliens are 
generally not vigorously enforced. Lesotho has been one of those 
countries where entry by aliens has been very easy.
There is no special law for the control of refugees in Lesotho.
Two provisions of the Aliens Control Act of 1966, namely section 38 
and the Fourth Schedule, govern the entry, sojourn and removal of 
refugees. Section 38(1) provides:
"If any international treaty or convention relating to 
refugees is or has been accepted by or on behalf of the 
Government of Lesotho, an alien who is a refugee within the 
meaning of such a treaty or convention shall not be refused 
entry into and sojourn in Lesotho, and shall not be expelled
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from Lesotho in pursuance of the provisions of this Act except 
with his consent or except to the extent that is permitted by 
that treaty or convention, subject to any reservation that may 
be in force at the material time.
Lesotho is party to the UM Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
1951 and to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the 
PAL) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
1969. The effect of section 38(1) is to make these Conventions part of the 
municipal law of Lesotho without any specific municipal legislation.
According to the Fourth Schedule of the Aliens Control Act, a person 
who arrives in Lesotho claiming to be a refugee reports himself to the 
authorities and applies for condonation of any contravention of the immigration 
law in respect of his entry or presence in Lesotho as the case may be. 
Provisional authority is then granted for him to stay in Lesotho for a 
period not exceeding a month subject to any conditions which may be attached. 
Sucn period of a stay may be extended from time to time until a final 
decision as to the status of the person is made. The provisional permission 
to stay is very important to refugees because it means that a refugee cannot 
be denied enrry into Lesotho.
The claim of the refugee is then investigated by the Minister. If 
satisfied that the alien is indeed a refugee, he in consultation with the
Solicitor-General, may direct that the person be allowed to stay in Lesotho
on stated conditions and for a specified length of time. He may direct 
that the person be freed from any prosecution for infringing the 
immigration laws.
In case the alien should be dissatisfied with the decision of the
Minister as to whether he is a refugee and as to whether Lesotho is
party to an international treaty relating to refugees, the High Court 
has power to make the necessary declaration on the application of the 
alien. Unlike in Botswana and in Swaziland (as we shall see), the 
Minister in Lesotho has not got sole discretion to determine who a refugee is.
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No restrictions as to residence are placed on the 
freedom of refugees. The policy and practice of Lesotho has 
been to permit refugees to settle amongst the ordinary 
inhabitants. There has been no indication, even after the 
December 1982 attack by South African forces into Lesotho, 
that there will be a change of policy on this matter.
No particular restrictions are applied against refugees 
in obtaining employment. Like every alien they need a work 
permit before being employed. The educational facilities of 
the country are open, not only to refugees but to most Black 
South Africans who have been forced to flee their country 
since the 1976 riots.
The Minister may withdraw without assigning any reason 
a provisional authority for an alien refugee to stay in
Lesotho. The power is subject to the right of a refugee to
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apply to court for a declaration that he is a refugee.
This is the only instance allowed under the A1iens Control 
Act wher-eby an alien claiming to be a refugee may be expelled. 
Lesotho has not made any reservations against the provisions 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This means that this country 
may not return refugees to countries where they could be 
persecuted. There has not been in recent years a case of a 
refouler on grounds of security and serious crime.
Refugees in Lesotho face three basic problems, namely, 
their personal safety, and secondly, the risk of expulsion on 
the basis of engaging in the local politics. The third problem 
is their economic welfare. The problem of personal safety to 
refugees was clearly demonstrated when on December 9, 1982
South African troops crossed the border into Lesotho and attacked 
refugees in their homes in Maseru, killing several of them as 
well as a number of Lesotho's nationals. The Lesotho Raiiamentary 
Force was paralyzed and took no apparent action against the
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invaders who operated leisurely throughout the early morning.
By 10 O'clock in the morning the invaders were reported to
307be still in Maseru.
At the funeral of the dead refugees, the Prime Minister 
of Lesotho made startling remarks. He said Lesotho was infiltrated 
by South African spies. He went on to say that he
knew of the impending attack, but did not know of the date 
when it would take place! Some people have asked that, if 
that was so, why were the refugees not warned? Why is it that 
our forces were not on alert? Why did the government not 
publicise this intended attack in international circles?
Lesotho often condemned South Africa for that country's policies, 
yet here was an opportunity being missed of showing clearly 
the hostile intentions of that country.
The basic suDport of the welfare of refugees comes from 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Apart from 
day to day subsistence of refugees, this instit u t i o n  has assisted 
in many respects in the building of institutions for assistance 
towards the welfare of refugees. The National U niversity of 
Lesotho has benefitted a lot from the Com m i s s i o n e r  in return 
for admitting refugees. This means that this country derives 
a benefit from the presence of refugees in the country.
Research into the refugee problem is hampered by the fact 
that the problem is covered by the Official Secrets Act of 1967. 
An amendment of 1978 made the "obtaining" of i n formation 
c oncerning refugees an offence. The long title of the Act sets 
out the purpose of the law as being to provide for the prevention 
of espionage and the obtaining of i n formation "prejudicial to
300
the interests of Lesotho, its citizens and refugees therein".
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The operative law for the control of refugees is the
309Refugee Control Order of 1978. This law does not define
a refugee. But since Swaziland is party to the Protocol 
Relating to the Status of R e f u g e e s , it may be assumed that 
the definition of a refugee there set out is the operative one 
in Swaziland. Refugees who enter Swaziland must within seven 
days of such entry obtain a permit for their stay in Swaziland 
from the Permanent Secretary who shall not refuse such permit 
if such a refusal means the return of the refugee to the
310country where he came from to be subjected to physical attack.
If there is no such fear the Permanent Secretary has complete 
discretion to refuse such a permit. A failure to obtain a permit 
makes the refugee's presence unlawful.
The Minister may declare any alien to be a refugee, and 
he may declare reception and refugee settlements and appoint 
somebody to be in charge of such places. Provision for the 
r egistr a t i o n  of refugees and the issue of identity cards to 
them as well as the maintenance of a register of refugees, are 
m a d e .
Refugees are prohibited from possessing arms and a mmuni­
tion, which articles they must surrender as soon as they enter 
Swaziland. Section 9(1) provides that:
"IMo vehicle in which a refugee enters Swaziland, or 
which is acquired by or comes into the possession 
of a refugee, while in Swaziland, shall be used by 
such refugee save with the permission of an a utho­
rised officer or otherwise than in accordance with 
the terms of such permission".
This p r o h i bition against the use of vehicles led to a convic-
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tion and sentence in Shadrack Maphumulo v.R.
(iii) 5wazi land
1DQ
The Permanent Secretary decides where refugees shall 
stay, whether in reception camps or other settlements. It 
is an offence to leave or attempt to leave such places, or to 
engage in conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.
S e ction 17 provides for immunity from liability for 
things done in good faith under the law by public servants.
Refugees are subject to return to the country where
they came from at any time on the orders of the Minister. A
court c onvicting a refugee may also order his return. IMo such
order shall be made, however, if in the opinion of the Minister
or of the court, such a refugee may be tried, detained,
r estricted or punished without trial for an offence of a political
nature after his arrival in that country, nor is he likely to
312be s u b j ected to physical attack in such a country. There is,
however, no provision that the Minister's opinion may be tested 
in a court of law.
Throughout the years, from the time of independence, 
refugees have never had an altogether easy time in Swaziland. 
Most of them came from South Africa and Mozambique. Since 
they b e l onged to one or other of the liberation movements they 
were regarded as being capable of toppling the government and 
they were seen as endangering Swaziland's relations with her 
neighbours. Another fear was that they would compete with 
the nationals over the meagre resources of the country. It 
was also feared that they would radicalise the normally co n ­
servative p o p u lation of that country, especially the youth.
This fear was intense following the 1975 riots in South Africa 
when many young persons came to Swaziland to seek asylum.
As far back as 197D Swaziland's Foreign Minister defended 
his government's policies towards refugees before a United
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Nations meeting in Lusaka by complaining that the refugees
were endangering the security and the very existence of his
country. He said that refugees therefore had to reform and
abstain from indulging in politics. He went on to point out
that if his country was invaded by the "big powers" (this
being a reference to 5outh Africa and Portuguese Mozambique),
313no one would come to Swaziland's rescue.
As a result, over the years several clampdowns on 
refugees have occurred. A recent example is the declaration 
in 1978 of several members of the Pan- A f r i c a n i s t  Congress of 
Azania (South Africa) as prohibited immigrants when they were 
accused of attempting to set up a military base in Swaziland. 
They were detained pending the finding of a country willing 
to take them. Three of them were charged and two convicted 
of arms o f f e n c e s . ^ 11* The defence lawyer, Musa Shongwe (a
Swazi national) was subsequently detained without trial for
.315 a long time!
Tn 1979 the clampdown increased in intensity. More
refugees were detained. They were held in camps and prisons
throughout the country. Conditions under detention were
poor, there being no medical facilities; visitors were not
allowed to see them; there was no mail, nor access to legal 
316representation.
Individual instances of the treatment of refugees may
throw some light into Swaziland's policies. In 1971 Leonard
Nikane was refused asylum after South Africa accused him of
being implicated in an on-going trial far treason. He was
not departed, but was detained pending the finding of a country
317of asylum willing to take him. Phineas Nene was detained
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in July 197L and released in January 1977. Some refugees
are held in terms of the Detention Order. Valakaya Shange
made a speech at the funeral of a youth leader of the iv.n .l .C
where Dr. Zwane, that part y's  leader, also spoke. Shongwe
was af ter ward s detain ed and held under 60 days detention. In
respon se to cri ticism the go ver nmen t resp onde d by explain ing
that he had fomented a strike in 1966 and had broken his
cond iti on of asylum by engagi ng in politics. The ex plan ation
went an to say that he had earlier been ord ere d to leave
319Swaziland, but had ref use d to go.
Swaz ila nd som eti mes  returns refugees to their country
of origin. In June 19S0 some 60 refugees were returned
involuntarily to Mozambi que.  More refugees were be lie ved  to
have been returned  in this ma nner later in the year.
Mozambi que  resp ond ed by depar tin g four Swazi refugees to 
320Swaz ila nd in August. There was also evidence that it was
some times a practice of Swaziland to hand over South Afri can
refugees "already gagged and bound" to South Afr ica n agents
32 1who came to fetch them from Swaziland. Dhaya Pillay was
abducted in February  19S1 to South Africa by abdu ctor s from
Mozamb iqu e and South Africa. These men were caught and
charged. But their case was never pr oceeded with after they
322were granted bail in closed door proceedings. This action
or rather non-action indicates that Swazil and  sometimes 
co-operat es in the abduction of refugees.
Imme dia tel y after the South Afri can  raid into Lesotho 
against refugees, Swaziland det ain ed many refugees. Acc ording 
to reports, these refugees are being held pending the finding 
of a new place of asylum. It is clear that Swa zila nd fears 
a similar attack aga ins t her. Even before the Lesotho attack, 
Swaz iland passed a tough law against refugees who posses arms.
It would appear from the fore going discu ss ion that 
Swaz ila nd is reluctant, despite st atem ent s to the contrary, to 
provide asylum to refugees. It may well be that this attitude
-  102 -
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is confined to South Afri can  refugees only. But it is open 
to spe c u l a t i o n  that Swa ziland has other priorit ies  over and 
above the object ives  of the O.A.U. The tough measu res  taken 
against refugees from South Africa seem to be an attem pt to 
impress upon that country the good faith of S w a z iland as a 
peac efu l neighbour. This may be because S w a z iland fears and 
is hea vily  depen dent  on South Africa.
Sw aziland has filed reserva tio ns to Artic le 22 and 3 A 
of the 1951 Refugee Con vention which deal with o b ligations to 
accord refugee s the same treatment as nationals, with respect 
to prim ary  education, and the same or better treat men t as 
aliens with respect to post-pr imar y educ ation (Article 3L).
If these are the only reserv ati ons it would appear that 
S waziland's refugee legislation is in cer tai n res pec t 
inconsistent with her internati on al obligations, e specially as 
concerns the exp ulsion and return of refugees.
7. Free Asso ciation and Peaceful Ass embl y
In all three co untries there are le gi slative measur es 
for the r egulation and conduct of public me eti ngs  and the 
right to form asso ciations. Botswana seems to impose the 
m i nimum of restrictions, while in the other two cou nt ries  
there are severe res tric tio ns of one kind or another. Even 
where there may be no specific law pr ohibiting gather ings  
of a given  type the discr etio nar y powers of of fi cers may be 
such that such gath eri ngs are effecti vely  p r e vented or 
sever ely  restricted.
In Botswana and Sw aziland the laws re gulating ga thering wen 
d rafte d more care ful ly than was the case in Lesotho. In 
Le sotho almost every ga th ering requires a permit, wher eas  in 
the other two co untries some gatherincp are exempted. In 
Lesot ho the law is not strictly enforc ed in the man ner  in
-  -lot* -
which it is drafted, but the p ossibility is always there 
that un suspecting pe rsons could be trapped.
(i ) Bo tswana
Article 13 of the Con s t i t u t i o n  guarant ees the freedom 
of assembly and of as soc iation. Pe rmissible limit ati ons are 
those in the interest of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morali ty or public health, for p r o t ecting the 
rights of others and for im pos ing re strictions on public 
officers or teachers. Trade unions may also be regulated.
These li mit ations must be reas ona bly j ustifiable in a 
demo cratic society.
Public  meetings and pr ocessions are re gul ated by the
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Public Order Act of 1967. In terms of this law,
gather ings  are di vided into two, viz, those which take place
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in controll ed areas, and those in uncontr o l l e d  areas.
327The Min iste r may declare co ntrolled areas, in the Gazette.
These have usually been urban areas. Me et ings  which take 
place in controll ed areas should be a u t h orised by an official 
permit, while those in uncon-trolled areas do not need such 
authority.
Certa in mee tin gs are exempt from the re quirements of 
official authority. These are as follows:
for religious, educational, recreation al,  sporting, 
social or chari ta ble purposes;
for the conduct of any agricul t u r a l  or indus tria l 
show or for the sale of goods or cattle;
for the purp ose  of revi ewi ng or par t i c i p a t i n g  in 
any theatrical, c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c  or firew ork s displays;
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me et ings  of the "kgotla"; 
by a town council or district;
by or on behalf or a candidate for election in 
any Parliam e n t a r y  or Town or Distric t council 
e l ection after the issue of the writ of election;
3 2 8by a represe n t a t i v e  of the government.
It should be noted, however, that these ex emptions are
confin ed to meet ing s and they do not extend to p r o c e s s i o n s .
These two terms are defined separ ate ly and diff er entl y in the 
329law. It should be noticed again that there is no specific
exemption in favour of trade union activity. The failure to 
make such an exemption may greatly hamper the effec tiv e 
exercise of indu str ial rights.
A p plications for permi ssi on to hold meeting s and p r o ­
cessi ons  in con trolled areas should be made to a Chief or 
to a Dist rict  Com miss ion er. Perm ission will be granted if 
the official is sat isfied that the gat hering will not lead to 
a breach of the peace. Condi tio ns may be attac hed to the 
permit. There is, however, no way in which an app li cant  
could test the good faith of the official in refus ing to issue 
a permit.
Unautho r i z e d  gatherin gs are illegal and may be stopped 
by the Police. Everyon e who takes part in such a gath eri ng 
is in breach of the law. The lack of kno wle dge of the
illeg ali ty does not appear to be a defence. Gather ings  in 
uncontr o l l e d  areas may be re gulated by a Police Off ice r of 
or above the rank of Assistant Su pe rintendent if he believe s 
that the gathe ring  may occa sio n serious public disorder, and 
he may thereby impose nec essa ry and rea sonable conditions.
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The Public Order Act is a short piece of l e gislation 
c ontaining nine sections. It does not purp ort  to convert 
the guar ant eed freedom into a privilege.
Trade Union activity is governed by the Trade Unions 
Act of 1 9 6 9 ^ 1 and the Trade Disputes A c t ^ ^  of the same 
year. Trade Unions must register wit hin  28 days of their 
formation. Unreg ist ered  unions are not to carry out their 
activities. The Trade Disputes Act establishes ar bitration 
trib unals and boards of inquiry for the se ttlement of disputes. 
Strikes and lock-outs are reg ulat ed in such a way that they 
should be resorted to after a failure of the a rbitration 
p r o c e d u r e s .
In terms of the Es sential Servic es (Arbitrati on)  A c t ,^ 3 ^ 
only ar bitration proce dur es may be res orte d to if the industry 
involves essential services. The Mi ni ster  has power to amend 
the list of essential services. In this way he could limit 
trade union action.
There have been occ asional student d e m o nstrations in
which riots have resulted. But it ap pears that the Police
have used re straint in sup pressing such disorders. The
d e m onstration in support of Sergean t Tswaipe who was being
charg ed with the murder of three whites in the Tuli Block
area might have passed without incident, but it was not allowed
to go through a part of Gaborone. This led to a riot. According
to W e i s f e l d e r , the refusal to permit the d e m o n s t r a t i o n  through
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the Mall in Gaborone was due to over-cautious officials.
This underl ine s what was stated earlier that there is no legal 
way in which official decisions may be tested under the Public 
Order Act.
Orga nis ed labour is held to a strict discipline in its 
demand for higher wages. The policy of government is to 
prevent the em ergence of a hi ghly paid class compared to the 
rural population. On this ground strikes by mine workers 
have been discouraged. The policy, however, seems to fail 
because civil servants have been allowed higher wages. Trade 
union ac tivi ty has also centr ed on the qu est ion of racial 
discrimination. In 1981 expat ria te white mine workers were 
accused of calling Afr ica ns "kaffirs". A Parli amen tar y 
Standing Comm itte e was est ablished to keep watch over d e velop­
ments and to see to it that race relations legi sla tion  was 
enforced.
( i i ) Lesotho
In Rex, v. Tumelo Sesinyl and O t h e r s ^ ^  the defence 
had at tempted to show that meetings of the Ba sutoland 
Congress Party are not permitted by the auth ori ties  in 
Lesotho. Comme ntin g on this piece of evidence Mr. Justice 
Rooney said:
"I know of no law in Lesotho which pr oscribes 
polit ica l parties or political activities which
are le gitimate and do not impinge on the
337security of the State".
This may be correct, if one takes a superficia l view of 
these things. The reality is, however, different, as we 
shall att emp t to show below.
Polit ical  activi ty has been severel y re str icte d in 
Lesotho. The basic law gove rni ng meetings and proc ess ions  
is the Internal Security (Public Meetin gs and Processions)
Act 1973 .338 This Act appli ed to all meetings, and the term
- 1 □ 7 -
"meeting" is defined as an assembly, conc ourse or gat her ing
339of pers ons pursuing a common  purpose. It app lied to all
p r ocessions which were defined as a meetin g mo ving from one 
place to another. These de fin itions were very wide. They 
includ ed funerals, sports meetings, social and pol iti cal 
gatherings.
Every mee tin g should be held on the author ity  of a
p o l i ceman in comm and of a police sta tio n (in the case of
urban areas) and of a Chief (in rural areas). App l i c a t i o n
to hold a meet ing  must first be made to a peace of ficer
who may grant or refuse such permission. If he su sp ected
upon re asonable grounds that the breach of the peace may
occur at such a meet ing  he may refuse his permission. These
3 AOrules appl ied to pro cessions as well. Where p e r m ission
was gran ted  the peace officer may impose conditi ons  if such
a me eting or procession was to be held in a publi c place.
Such con ditions included a cond iti on as to the time for the
3A 1holding -of the meet ing  or procession.
By vi rt ue of these provisions, opposition poli tic al 
acti vit y was effective ly min imi sed  if not banned. A 
polit ica l party which took an u ncompromising stand against 
the go vernment wou ld either be refused p e r m ission or, if 
a llo we d to hold a meeting, would be subj ect ed to ha rassment 
by the police. Reg u l a t i o n  5(1) of the re gul ations made 
under this law pro vided that:
"Any member of the Lesotho Mou nte d Police or a
Headman may attend any meet ing or p rocession
and may take or cause to be taken any such steps
as may be necessary or expe dien t to ensure orderly
3A2c ond uc t and the safety of the public".
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The powers of the police are so wide that members of the
p a r a-military force on oc casion attended  a church service
3A3in unif orm and fully armed.
Immediately after the 1970 po litical turmoil the
Prime Mi nis ter said he was sending politi cs an a holiday
for five years to permit developm ent with out polit ica l 
iuu
in te rference. That policy was enforc ed th rough the di s ­
cr et iona ry powers contai ned  in this law. Only meet ing s of 
the Basotho National Party or those in support of the 
g overn men t or in support of polici es approve d by the gov e r n ­
ment were permitted.
Some funerals were used as an important forum for 
op position politics. No funerals were ever banned, and 
prior p ermission was not required for having  a funeral.
The role of the police was co nfi ned to sp ying on the speakers 
at these funerals.
In st itutions of higher learning are always a target
of gove rnme nts  in Africa. The National U niversity of
Lesotho is no exception. In 1980 the police broke into a
3A5student meet ing  and attend ed it by force. Since the public
are normally allowed on campus, the police appeared to have a 
right to be present. The matter was not sent to Court for a 
final judgement, but it is a good ind ication of how far Lesotho 
had moved in the dire cti on of being a police state.
Lipuo Mokha chan e is a middle aged man who believes  that 
he is a prophet. He has got a fal lowi ng of b e l ievers who 
wear dark blankets. For many years he has pr eached repentance 
to Lesotho pol it icia ns and those in authority. He is, however, 
a target of the security police in Lesotho. Fr om  local press 
reports it appears that the police believe that he is in 
league with the Basutola nd Congress Party of Ntsu Mokhehle
and that he is using reli gio us meeting s as a di sgu ise for 
polit ica l activity. He has been subje cte d to harass men t and 
de te ntion with out  trial on several occasions. It appears 
that he has now finally left Lesotho. His relig ious  movement 
is not ap pro ved by the government, but it has not been banned.
Trade union ac tiv ity is al lowed in Le sotho in terms of
3i»6the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law 196A. Several
trade unions have been re gistered in terms of this law.
Union act ivit y is, however, restricted. Strikes are harmful
to the fragile economy of Lesotho. Demands for hi gher  wages
3 A7are di sco uraged. In fact, advertisements for inve stm ents
state that labour in Les oth o is cheap. IMo strikes are
3LQ
al lowed in respect of "e ssential services". The g o v e r n ­
ment can force wo rkers back to work by decla rin g their
industry "essential", as it recently did in respect of bank
. 3A9e m p l o y e e s .
(iii) Swazi land
In 1973 political parties were banned, inc luding "similar 
bodies that cu ltivate and bring about dis tur banc es and ill- 
feelings wi thin the Natio n (sic)", in terms of Decree  No. 11 
of the King's Proclam a t i o n  of 12 April 1973. The new Constitution 
of 1976 did not repeal Decree No. 11. Polit ica l
ac ti vity  is therefore still pr ohibited in Swaz iland to-day.
The basic law gov erning meeting s and p r o c ession in the 
Public Order Act 1 9 6 3 .350 A "public meeting" is def ine d as 
a public gathe ring  for any purp ose of mare than ten persons, 
but does not include:
- meeti ng s by the King or Chiefs;
- meetin gs by local authorities;
- meeti ng s of member s of trade unions which are 
duly regist er ed and which meetin gs  have been 
ca lled for a lawful purpose of such bodies;
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a gathe rin g or assembly conv ene d and held 
excl usively for social, cultural, charitable,
recr eational, religious, professional, commercial,
351and industrial purposes"
352
"Pro ces sion " means a meet in g from one place to another.
This def i n i t i o n  is much more sensib le than the def inition 
of a m e eting in the law of Lesotho.
Prior per mission must be obtai ne d to advertise or hold 
a meeti ng or p r o c e s s i o n . A  police officer may issue a 
licence if he is sat isf ied  that the propose d meeting or 
p r o c e s s i o n  is not likely to pre judice the m a i n t enance of 
pu bl ic order. He may refuse such permiss ion if:
- any person involve d or likely to be in vol ved  in 
the gathering has recently contrave ned  this law;
- the ga thering was advert ise d witho ut the grant 
of a licence for that purpose;
- the a p plication for a licence has been made less
'than seven clear days prior to the holdi ng of the 
35 Apr op osed  gathering.
A c c o rding to this law a licence may be cancelled if the
meet ing  or procession appears to be for un law ful  or immoral
p u r p o s e s . The Co mmi ssioner of Police is empowered to
stop any sp orting events or en te rtainments of any kind if
356
public order is likely to be endangered. Once more we
see a wide dis cretion being con fer red an an off ici al who is 
e mpowered to decide on such controve rsia l issues as morality. 
In a cou ntr y such as Swaz ila nd de cisions to refuse permis s i o n  
for the hol din g of meeti ngs  will not usually be que stioned 
through the judicial process because, first, pe ople are not 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and they do not have suffici ent  resou rces  to 
pay for mat ters  of principle. Secondly, it woul d be unwise
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to enter into a contest with the go vernment which has so 
many options, such as the citizenship, imm igration and 
dete ntion laws, at its disposal.
Political activity was p rohibited in 1973. In the
el ections for the Electoral Co llege in 1978, political
canvas sing  was proh ibited and the bulk of the N.N.L.C.
357leader shi p were in detention.
Trade unions are perm itt ed to operate in terms of the
3 50Trade Unions and Em ployers Org a n i z a t i o n  Act of 1966 and
the Industrial, Conciliation and Settl eme nt Act of 1963.
These laws prov ided  for the regi s t r a t i o n  of trade unions and 
for the settlement of trade disputes.
Major strikes occurred in 1976. Railways workers
demanded better co nditions and benefits. They march ed to
Lobamba to present their grievan ces which were subse quen tly
accepted. A Royal Comm ission was appointed and made
recommendations which were accepted. Racial dis crim inatory
practices were to c e a s e . T h i s  strike was followed by
the teachers strike to back up demands for highe r wages.
The police broke it up, but a dialogue followed. The teachers
361succee ded  in obtai ning  pay increases.
Although trade union activit y is permitted, such activity
must not threaten  what are considered national interests and
the Swazi way of life. In 1977 the Nation al Teachers
362Organisation was declared a political party and banned.
8 . Discrim i n a t i o n
( i ) Race D i s c rimination
Being neigh bour s to apartheid South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaz ila nd are nat ural ly co ncerned about race 
disc rimination. Such disc r i m i n a t i o n  spills over into these
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states in the form of ex patriate South Afri can  whites who 
do business  in or visit those countries. Migrant workers 
are affected by d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  and they are co nditioned by 
it. The colonial era has left a legacy of inferio ri ty 
co mplexes an the part of Black people and normal human 
re lationships are often diffi cul t between black and white 
people.
Swaziland, with its huge Euro pea n and Eurafr ic an 
population, has the worst race relatio n problem. At 
i ndepe nde nce an att emp t to build a picture of harmoni ous  
race relati ons  for outside con sum ption soon failed. 
Historically Eur ope ans  ac qui red  the fertile land of Swaziland 
and be haved no di fferently from their kins men  in
South Africa towards Africans. Because of this econom ic 
s uperior ity they were able to di scri min ate against blacks 
in economi c and social matters. The black man was 
dehumanised in order to justify his exploitation. It is not 
su rprising then that in the 1980's a white woman dared to 
compose the deroga tor y poem which was the subject of a 
prosec u t i o n  in Rex v. Dinah S h u b .^^^
Botswana and Lesotho have smaller numbers of Europeans
in their pop ulations. While during the colonial period
Africans su ffer ed from Eu rop ean prejudice susta ine d by
colonialism, after independence those countries have had a
36 A
lesser task in proh i b i t i n g  race discrimination.
In Botswana race discrimination is prohibi ted  in terms 
of the constit u t i o n  and the Penal C a d e . Section 9A of the 
Penal Code makes it an of fence for anyone to discrim inat e 
on grounds of colour, race, nati ona lity  and creed. The 
ma ximum penal ity  is P50D or 6 months imprisonment. This 
provision has to be read in the light of the consti tut ion al
provi sio ns permi tti ng distin ctio ns in favour of citizens 
against aliens. Every p r o s e cution has to be with the 
consent of the Atto rney -Ge nera l.
What is  surpr isin g is that there appear to be no 
pr osecutions for breach of the pro h i b i t i o n  aga in st race 
discrimina tion . This cannot be an in dication of har moni ous  
race relations, because labour disputes have cent red around 
race discrimin ati on.  The reason for a lack of prosec uti ons 
may be the diffic ult y of provi ng race prejud ice  in concrete 
c a s e s .
In Lesot ho the oper ativ e law is the Race Rel ations 
Order of 1971. As is the case in Botswana this law
prohi bit s racial discrimination, but only in res pec t of 
facili tie s or services of a public nature and in places of 
public resort. There is no menti on of the pro h i b i t i o n  
applyin g in the area of employment.
The enfo rcement mac hin ery is recon cili ati on. A 
compl ain t is made to a Min iste r who may order an i n v e s t i g a ­
tion into it. If such a compl ain t is well founded he 
attempts to bring about reconci l i a t i o n  betw een the parties. 
If no volunt ary agr eeme nt is reached he may apply to the 
High Court for an order com pelling compliance.
Once more there have been no repor ted  cases under 
this law. But it should be stated that officia l threats 
against d iscrimination have been issued. Comp laints have 
come from emp loyees against emp loy ers who more often  than 
not are white. For ex ample in the recent labour dispute 
invol vin g banks, one of the compla ints  was the pay 
di f ferentials in favour of expatri ate  whites.
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Swaziland att ended ta race d iscrimination even
before in dependence. The Race Relations Act of 1962 
proh ibits racial dis c r i m i n a t i o n  in cer tai n listed premises, 
namely, banks, bars, cinemas, eating places, hotels, shops, 
tea rooms, and theatres. The enfor cem ent mach in ery is 
similar to that of Leso tho  except that if there is a failure 
at reconci lia tion , the court may impose pe nalties on the 
guilty party.
Race disc r i m i n a t i o n  is an emo tional issue in Swaziland.
Its e xpression takes many forms, like citizenship. In 1971,
for example, b a ckbenchers in the National Assembly are said
to have expres sed concer n at the ease with which South
Africans obtained  Sw aziland's pas sports and nationality.
The Deputy Prime Minister is said to have said that he was
aware of this fact, and that what was annoying was the fact
that it is the parents of the chi ldr en who despise Swazi
girls who are given pas sports, this being a refe re nce to
white girls who refuse to take part in Swazi cultural 
3 68ceremonies. Again in 1970 the Prime Minist er  urged
those discrim i n a t e d  again st to report to District Com missioners,
these being r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  officer s under the race relations
law. St rong a b j e ction has also been taken against white
South Afr ican s who crass the border into Swaz ila nd far sex
369pleasures with Black women.
Labour disputes have also centred around race d i s c r i ­
mina tion and the gov ernment has even intervened.
In all three count rie s the internal race pr ob lems  are 
a small part of the race qu estion in So uth ern Africa. These 
countr ies  have no way of fighting racism in South Africa, 
yet their inhabit ant s have to find work there. Racism in 
South Africa does not obey the inte rna tion al law rule that
367
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aliens must be acco rde d an inte rn atio nal  standar d of 
treatment. A Bl ackm an is disc riminated against and 
exploited in that country regardless df whethe r he is a 
c itize n or not. The inhabitants of the three countries, 
therefore, suffer from racism despite their countries' 
efforts to prohibit the practice.
(i i ) Discrim i n a t i o n  and the A d m i nistration of Justice
It was pointed out in the i n t roduction that 
one o u t s t anding cha racteristic of the legal sys tem s of 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swa zil and is the "duality" of their 
laws. The receiv ed law applies to all inhabitants, while 
the in dig eno us law applies to the Afri can p opulations as 
well. This duality is reflected in the systems of courts: 
one sy stem adm inis ter s the received law and all inha bit ants  
are sub jec t to the jur isd iction of that court system. 
Africans are i n addition, subject to the j u risdiction 
of the "traditio nal"  courts which ad minister the indig eno us 
law. A question which arises is wheth er this ar rangement 
is discrim i n a t o r y  or not.
The three countries give an answer of one kind or
anoth er for this question. In Botswana it is laid down in
the Con s t i t u t i o n  that it is not d i s c riminatory if a law
makes p r o vision for the applica tio n of cust omar y law to
member s of a parti cul ar race, comm unit y or tribe in respect
of any matter to the exclu sio n of any other law which is
3 70a pplicable to the other persons. In Le sotho and Swaziland
the rec eption laws provid ed that in dige nou s laws could
be appl ied  to Africans. These recep tion  laws have
rema ined  in force. It is therefore clear that this type of 
dis t i n c t i o n  based on ethnic origins is not prohib it ed. Any 
people wou ld normally prefer  their own law to a for eig n 
legal system.
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The other aspect of the ma tter is the administration 
of the in digenous law. Africa ns are subject to two systems 
of courts. This again has found accep tan ce in all three 
countries. But we should pro ceed  to examine the qua lit y of 
justice in these courts.
The cust oma ry courts in all three cou ntries are empowered 
to ad min iste r the indigeno us law, any writ ten  law which the 
court is authoris ed to administer, and other wr itten laws which 
the govern men t may specify. This means, therefore, that these 
courts are really not "traditi on al" courts, but are statutory 
courts of a special kind.
The pres iding off ice rs in these courts are men and women
who are su ppos ed to know the ind igen ous  law. In Botswana the
Cust omary Courts Act provide s that the co mposition of these
371courts shall be acco rdi ng to cust oma ry law. This in fact
means that a Chief shall preside. In Lesotho presi din g 
officers are appo int ed by the government. They need not be 
Chiefs. In Swa zil and  the constit u t i o n  of the Court is according 
to customary law, and this, as in Botswana, means that Chiefs 
preside. While the presiding of fic ers may be familiar with 
the indigen ous  law, they are not necessa rily  famil iar with
the st atutory law. The trial of a person on a st atutory
offence before these courts may ther efo re lead to injustice.
372In Swa zila nd in 1977 the Crimes Act was made to be 
a dmini ste red by the cust oma ry courts in respect of offences 
of lo itering for purpo ses  of prostit uti on. From that time 
convictions for this crime increased, and it is reported 
by IMhlapho that a police report expressed satisfa c t i o n  that 
these courts were help ing  to reduce this type of crime.
The rules of proced ure and evi denc e fallowed by a 
court are very im portant in c onnection with the outcome of
a dispute. In all three countr ies  the cus tomary courts are
to follow cust omary rules of proc edu re and evidence except
if some other rules are laid down. In Lesotho the rules of
procedure are laid down by st atute and they are ordinar y
s i m p lified a ccusatory rules. A prob lem  which has arisen is
that the Af rican litigants, bein g used to some form of
inquisitorial procedure, do not appreci ate  the change, and
expect the p r e s iding offic er to do the ne ce ssary q u e s t ioning
of witnes ses . This is not fort hco ming  Bnd li tigants lose
37Acases they sh ould not lose. Legal represe n t a t i o n  becomes
necessary, but it is not allowed in respect of civil matters.
In the other two co untries the co ns eque nce s for a 
litigant or accus ed of follo win g cu stomary rules of proce dur e 
and evidenc e are that such a pe rs on may be better off before 
a Magistrates Court. Hears ay evidence, for example, could be 
perfectly a dmissible in a cust omar y court, while not admiss ibl e 
before the other system of courts. In all matters, whet her 
civil or criminal, before the cus tomary courts in Bot swa na and 
Swaziland, legal repr e s e n t a t i o n  is not allowed.
The li berty of the subject has been a matter of con cern
in con n e c t i o n  with cust oma ry courts. In Lesotho and Botswa na
378the court can grant bail. In Swa zil and  the Swazi Courts Act
does not authorise the gra ntin g of bail. The High Court has,
however, released accu sed  persons app ear ing before cus toma ry
courts on bail. These have been lucky persons who could
3 76afford  the as sistance of a lawyer.
So far we have e mphasized the absence of legal as si stan ce 
as a major defect in the cus tomary courts system. It should, 
however, be re ali zed that even if such as sist anc e was permitted, 
this woul d not nec essarily lead to justice. Lawyers are scarce 
in the three countries. Even if they were available, not many 
litig ant s could afford their help. Lastly, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  by 
lawyers does not always lead to justice.
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Lawyers are often more int erested in winn ing  cases than in 
the attain men t of justice. There would always be the risk 
of m i s l eading than ass isti ng the Court. In Lesotho, 
however, it does not appear that this has been the case 
in criminal matters.
In co nclusion it appears that the Afr ica n is worse 
off ap pearing before customary courts than he would be if 
he ap pea red before the other sy stem of courts. The problem 
is caused mainly by ex tending the J u r isdiction of the courts 
to no n-c ustomary laws.
The cu stomary courts system has advantages, however. 
First, there are no delays in the hea ring  of cases.
Seco nd, the system of law ad min istered by these courts, apart 
from statutes, is generally u nderstood by the litigants.
This reduces the need for legal assistance. Third, the 
proc edu res are simple and enco ura ge quick resolu t i o n  of 
matters before the court.
The ques tio n then is, what kind of reform sh ould be 
effected? It may well be that the trainin g of pre siding 
officers in both systems of law is desirable. The rules of 
evidence may have to be uni for m to a greater extent.
Judicial officers may have to be more alive to their duty 
to assist litigants through the m odern com p l i c a t e d  statutes.
(iii) Women and D iscrimination
There is general agreement that th roughout the world 
wom en  are discriminated against. It is also arguao le that 
where a partic ular  race or ethnic group is s u b jected to 
discrim ina tion , women tend to suffer more. What is not 
clear is the criteria used to det er mine  the exis tence of
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discr imin ati on. Most studies on wom en 's pr ob lems  have 
been by W e stern writers. The con cept ual  fr ameworks w ithin 
which these studies were done have been eth no cent ric . The 
cultural factor is, therefore, one p r oblem which faces 
those who study d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  against women.
C o l o n i a l i s m  has had a la sting impact on the cultures
of the farmer colonised peoples. There is evidence, for
example, which su gge sts  that the mo dern a u t h o r i t a r i a n  rulers
3 76of Africa have co pied their ways from colonia list s.
In Europe, notions about the inferio rit y of women were and 
are common. As a result of such notions, the statute books
and legal wr itings of We stern count rie s are laden with
3 77"ste reotyped distinc t i o n s  b e tween the sexes". This
legal herit age has be en  taken over by the former colonies. 
Consequently women are d i s criminated aga inst  on the basis 
of the values of aliens. Res earchers into discrim i n a t i o n  
against wome n have to make the necess ary  cultural d i s ­
tincti on b e tween r e c eived col oni al values and the values 
of the indige nou s culture.
The tr aditional A f rican cultur es may have been suitable 
in older times. This is no longer true. Econom ic re lations 
have now changed because of the impact of colonia lis m. In 
So ut hern  Africa rac ism  provi des a dimension which disrupts 
A fri ca n social relations. Afric an values operate in an 
abnormal e n v i r onment and this leads to o ppression against 
sections of the A f rican population.
Africa has a di versity of cultures. The tend enc y in 
stud ying Africa has been to genera lis e with out maki ng the 
necessary distinct ions . Anthrapolugiscs may be an exce ption 
in this regard, al tho ugh their works have someti mes  been 
ignored. If such d i stinctions are not made, there is bound 
to be confusion. We often read or are told that in Africa
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girls have to herd animals while boys attend school. In 
Lesotho, on the other hand, the reverse is the case. LJe 
are told that women are left out of im portant dec isi ons 
in the family; they are treated like children. But Lesotho 
women  have simply too many res ponsibilities beca use the 
men migr ate in huge numbers to South Africa where they 
cont ract  diseas es and die young, thus leaving wom en with 
family resp onsi bilities. Ironically the migratory labour 
syst em seems to be a liberatory factor for women althou gh 
it is an evil system.
A di scussion of dis crim ination against wom en has to 
bear in mind all these factors, other wis e confu sio n is 
bound to arise. This survey does not attempt to formulate 
a theory of disc rimination against women. A lot of 
resear ch still has to be done an the matter. What we 
attempt to do is to hi ghlight some of the proble ms which 
face African women today.
In pra ctic e di scr imination against women takes two
forms. One form is legal, while the other is mere practic e
m otivated by stereo typ ical  nations about women. These two
forms interact. In the field of employment, for example,
the a s s u mption is that a woman employee is unstable; she
will marry and follow her husband. It is therefore
provided by legisl ati on in Lesotho that a woman em pl oyee
in the pu bli c service will be deemed to have re sig ned if
378she marries, but she may be employed on a daily basis.
The im pli cations are serious. The woman emplo yee  may be 
d ismissed easily and she is not entitl ed to a pension.
Such a pe nsion cons tit utes  family income, but it is being 
lost by the hu sband as well.
W ome n bear children. Yet this function is rega rde d 
as abnormal by employers, most of whom are w e s t e r n —
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orientated. Prefer en ce is given to men in employment.
If women are employed, the chil d - b e a r i n g  function is made 
diff icult by such techn iqu es as maternity leave wi thout 
pay, lack of child care facili tie s and dismissals.
The cultural factor may be pronounced. For example, 
in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the Afri can family is
patr ili nea l and patrilocal. Each family has a head who
3 79is a man. The head is a represen t a t i v e  of the family
in its dealings with the outside world. This means, 
therefore, that an ythi ng of im por tanc e which a woman does 
must be with the authority of the family head. Matters 
such as applying for a passport, in cl uding a child in the 
mother 's passport, apply ing  for credit, and se eking access 
to land, must all be done on the auth ority of a man. On 
this aspect the Roman-D ut ch Law provi de s for similar rules. 
All these rules are op pre ssi ve to women. Women whose 
guardians or husbands are away as migr an t wo rkers must 
find it very difficult to run their lives. The Af rican 
social o r g anisation on the other hand recogni ses  that a 
family must have a re presentative at all times. In practice, 
therefore, women do per for m fu nctions of men in the absence 
of the latter. This is espec ial ly the case in Lesotho.
The Roman-Du tch Law does not seem to be so flexible.
It appears that in order to und e r s t a n d  discri mina tio n 
against women the pro ble m must first be understood.
African wome n must lead the inquiry, instead of being told 
about their problems by w e s t e r n - o r i e n t a t e d  writers.
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